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ABSTRACT
Aviation safety outcomes, such as mishaps, are a product of an aviation
organization’s safety culture (Reason, 2008; Reiman & Pietikäinen, 2012). Safety
cultures should be assessed in order to improve an organization’s state of safety
(Adjekum et al., 2015; Cooper, Collins, Bernard, Schwann, & Knox, 2019; Wiegmann,
Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, & Gibbons, 2004). Questionnaires are one of the best ways
of obtaining information about an organization’s safety culture (Wiegmann et al., 2004;
Wald, Gray, & Eatough, 2018). Additionally, the extent to which aviation hazards are
reported (hazreps) serve as an indicator of the health of an aviation Safety Management
System (SMS) (Adjekum et al., 2015; Cooper et al., 2019) and as a marker of a proactive
safety culture (Gu & Itoh, 2013; Reason, 2008; Reiman & Pietikäinen, 2012). Proactive
safety cultures are linked to hazard mitigation amongst aviation organizations (Barach,
2000; Reiman & Pietikäinen, 2012). In light of this, and in an effort to have a proactive
safety culture, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) wishes to know the extent of the
relationship between its annual Operational Climate Survey (safety survey) and hazreps.
The main research question for this thesis is: What is the extent of the relationship
between USCG aviation safety survey data and the total of aviation hazards reported?
First, an Exploratory Factor Analysis was conducted to determine the validity and
reliability of the safety survey using data from FY 2015 to FY 2018 (n = 10,622) and to
reduce the survey data to clusters of items within factors. The survey was found to be

xviii

statistically reliable. The averaged survey items within factors represented the survey in
order to perform a Pearson’s Correlation procedure between the survey data and hazrep
totals per USCG air station (n = 28) per year. In addition, multiple regression procedures
were carried out to determine if the safety survey was predictive of the extent to which
hazards were reported. This research revealed that there was no statistically significant
correlation between the safety survey and hazreps, and consequently, the safety survey
was not predictive of hazreps.

xix

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
High risk industries such as aviation need to have safety-minded cultures in order
to mitigate risks and hazards. Key to being safety-minded is the need for safety
practitioners to assess the state of the organization and take action thereafter (Gu & Itoh,
2013). With such assessments, markers have been found to give an indication about how
an organization’s Safety Management System (SMS; defined later) is performing. One
marker of safety culture performance is the existence and quality of a reporting system
for accidents or close calls to be reported (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015).
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) administers an annual aviation
questionnaire called the USCG Operational Climate Survey (hereafter referred to as
“safety survey”). The safety survey is offered to all USCG personnel involved in aviation
(pilots, rescue swimmers, flight crew, maintainers, and aviation leadership) and assesses
the safety culture at each of the twenty-eight air stations. Several survey items pertain to
the five USCG-defined safety cultures (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311),
2016). The reporting culture is one of these wherein hazard reporting is key to the success
of an organization’s safety program. Reporting hazards involves individuals offering
information pertaining to risks, close calls, or near-misses (USCG Office of Aviation
Safety (CG-1311), 2016).
1

An organization’s safety culture may be categorized as proactive or reactive. In
order to catch hazards prior to their devolution into actual mishaps, there is emphasis on
organizations to cultivate and sustain a proactive culture (Reason, 2008). Hazard
reporting is characteristic of proactive safety cultures (Gu & Itoh, 2013; Reiman &
Pietikäinen, 2012). The ability for members in an organization to report hazards and the
extent to which this is done is linked to the health of an aviation safety culture (Cooper,
Collins, Bernard, Schwann, & Knox, 2019; Adjekum et al., 2015). Hindsight and analysis
of historic safety events is important to learn from previous mistakes; this practice also
enhances a just safety culture, thereby reducing a culture of blame. Proactive safety
management, however, is important in reducing accident rates by enabling organization
leaders the ability to instate preventative safety measures preemptive to mishap
occurrences (Barach, 2000).
Safety survey results are presently not used as a predictive tool at the USCG
headquarters or air station levels. There is potential for the Coast Guard aviation safety
survey data to act as a predictive tool if properly analyzed. The relationship between the
safety survey and the extent to which hazards are reported is unknown (A. Carvalhais, C.
Comperatore (USCG IRB), C. Wright (USCG Safety Programs Chief), A. Young, J.
Cooley, personal communications, October 4-16, 2017). Determining the extent of this
relationship is the purpose of this research.
USCG Safety Survey
The annual safety survey is “an in-depth audit of all phases of operations
involving safety” (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016, p. 20-3). With
2

survey results, air station leaders can obtain information about safety practices and safety
culture. The safety survey provides air station members the opportunity to anonymously
communicate safety issues (USCG, 2016). In addition to air station benefits, the Office of
Safety and Environmental Health (CG-113), a USCG Headquarters office, is responsible
for evaluating air station safety posture, gathering feedback on safety issues, and
understanding the efficacy of safety training programs and policy (USCG Office of
Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016).
Analyzing survey data is advantageous to the assessment of safety cultures
because survey respondents are free to provide opinions on their own perceptions of the
organization’s culture (Wreathall, 1995). Safety surveys provide leaders with a valuable
tool to assess the likelihood that aircraft and lives may be lost. Therefore, leaders should
treat survey results with thoughtful consideration in determining organizational safety
policies and practices (Schimpf, 2004).
Hazard Reporting and the Health of SMS
The extent to which hazards are reported (hereafter referred to as hazreps) serve
as a proactive marker of safety performance (Adjekum, et al., 2015; Cooper et al., 2019;
Gu & Itoh, 2013). Individuals’ knowledge of the reporting options, along with how to use
each option is crucial to the health of the reporting culture (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015).
For this research, hazreps are drawn from USCG Class D mishaps. Class D
mishaps are defined by the severity of injuries, cost, damage, as well as a sub-set of other
events defined by USCG policy. Within this sub-set, there is a list of events that “reveal
3

hazardous trends and underscore lessons learned…” and “must be reported to prevent
recurrence of similar events that could result in much greater injury or damage” (USCG
Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016, p. 3-4). This list includes: “Any events that
identify possible deficiencies in current operational policy or procedures; [issues with]
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE); or [airframe] configuration or performance”
(USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016, p. 3-5). Additionally, there is a more
specific list of aviation-related hazards that should be reported. These hazards are (USCG
Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016, pp. 3-5, 3-6):
1. Aeromedical events
2. Precautionary landings
3. Power loss
4. Propeller wash
5. Rotor wash
6. Engine wash
7. Weather-related mishaps
8. Jettison
9. Hoist shear
10. Equipment drops
11. Things falling off aircraft
12. Laser exposure
13. Near midair collisions
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Some hazards are subtle and require initiative on the behalf of aircrewmen and
maintainers to report. Examples of such subtle hazards are (USCG Office of Aviation
Safety (CG-1311), 2016, pp. 3-5, 3-6):
1. Unsafe work conditions
2. Resource gaps such as insufficient tools
3. Rogue aviators
4. Breakdowns in Crew Resource Management.
These hazards should be reported as they provide free lessons for USCG aviation
at large (USCG, 2016). It is with hazreps such as these that change in organizational
procedures are initiated (von Thaden, T. & Gibbons, A., 2008).
Coast Guard Air Stations
U.S. Coast Guard air stations range from 100 to 600 members. Air stations are
throughout the country along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, along the shores of the Gulf
Mexico and the Great Lakes, in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. Air stations conduct
varying missions that include homeland security protection, search and rescue, drug and
migrant interdiction, and fisheries enforcement (USCG Office of Aviation Forces (CG711), 2013).
The Relevance of this Research
Based on conversations with the Chief of Safety Programs (CG-113) and the U.S.
Coast Guard Institutional Review Board, the relationship between the safety survey and
the extent to which hazards are reported is presently unknown. This research investigated
5

if there is any relationship between the safety survey and hazreps, if there is a correlation,
or if the safety survey predicts hazreps (A. Carvalhais, C. Comperatore (USCG IRB), C.
Wright (Safety Programs Chief), A. Young, J. Cooley, personal communications,
October 4-16, 2017).
Safety Management Systems (SMS) are structures that enable the development of
policies and systems to promote and assess safety practices within organizations (Stolzer
& Goglia, 2015). Since hazreps are a proactive marker for the health of an SMS, it is
beneficial to the U.S. Coast Guard to determine the extent of the relationship between the
safety survey and hazreps (C. Wright, J. Cooley, personal communications, January 2,
2018). If there is a relationship, the safety survey can serve as an efficient means of
determining the health of air station SMS’s before hazards manifest into actual mishaps.
This research is beneficial regardless of the outcome of the analysis. Results will be
informative to USCG leaders whether there is a relationship revealed between variables
or not.
There is a gap in research on this topic throughout the aviation industry. There
exists a breadth of literature covering SMS assessment, including surveys and
questionnaires, as well as numerous books and articles covering the reporting culture and
its importance. However, there is a dearth of literature specifically assessing the
relationships between questionnaires and hazard reporting. This research study will
attempt to address this research gap in the aviation industry, while targeting a specific
U.S. Coast Guard need.

6

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to determine the relationship between the USCG
aviation safety survey and the extent to which hazards are reported. Additionally, this
study will add to the body of research pertaining to the interaction between safety culture
and hazard reporting.
Problem Statement
This study is intended to bolster the field of aviation safety culture research as
well as meet the needs of the USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1131). In the broadest
sense, the purpose of this study is to improve USCG aviation pillars of safety. These
pillars are Aviation Safety Policy, Risk Management, Assurance, and Promotion (USCG
Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016). This research focuses on the Safety
Promotion pillar, specifically the safety and reporting cultures (USCG, 2015).
Reporting safety concerns come in different forms. Specifically, reporting hazards
is an indicator of a positive SMS as a whole (Harris, 2016). The safety culture affects an
organization’s state of safety, which ultimately affects safety outcomes such as mishap
occurrences and avoidance (Reason, 2008).
This research seeks to determine the extent of the relationship between the annual
safety survey and hazard reporting. This knowledge will inform leaders at the air station
level as well as fleetwide throughout the U.S. Coast Guard.

7

Literature Review
Hazard Reporting and its Effect on Proactive Safety Cultures
Reason (2008) has written about collective mindfulness, a state in which
organizations are poised to optimally respond to mishaps. Organizations who have
collective mindfulness attempt to learn from hazard reports in an effort to thwart larger
scale hazards from turning into actual mishaps. Such organizations encourage the
reporting culture by rewarding those people who make reports, especially reports
pertaining to one’s own mistakes or near misses. The importance of this reward schema is
rooted in the premise that smaller incidents are relics of larger, potentially more
hazardous, issues within the organization (Reason, 2008). Looking beyond the people
who were proximal to a mishap, but instead, analyzing organizational influences that
were antecedents to mishaps, paints a more complete picture of an organization’s safety
culture (Dekker, 2002).
Hazard reports are free lessons that provide insight into errors that may possess
catastrophic potential. Identifying the right lessons from past events can be applied
proactively, thereby reducing the quantity and severity of future mishaps. Organization
members will only communicate hazards, however, if they feel it is safe to do so without
fear of reciprocating punishment (Gu & Itoh, 2013; McMurtrie & Molesworth, 2018;
Reason, 2008).
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The extent to which hazards are reported is integral to the success of an
organization’s safety management (McMurtrie & Molesworth, 2018). Failed safety
cultures are strongly connected to organizational accidents (Robertson, 2018). Hazards
are reduced as much as practicable when organizations have strong safety cultures and
advanced Safety Management Systems (Wang, 2011).
For an organization to proactively impose safety-related policy changes, leaders
need to rely on those free lessons that arrive in the wake of near misses. While major
mishaps may be denser with learned-lessons, they are too infrequent to use for regular,
nimble, organizational change. Therefore, proactive organizations attempt to forecast
major events by identifying hazardous factors, which in turn, aid in preventing these
hazards from materializing into mishaps (Reason, 2008). Analyzing such leading
indicators can increase organizational defenses against serious mishap potential in the
future. Insight into which hazards culminate into larger mishaps can assist leaders in
making decisions that steer the organization away from mishaps yet also continue to
bolster those defenses that have previously been effective (Van der Schraaf, Lucas, &
Hale, 1991). Reviewing historical data, such as hazreps, is a beneficial way to gain
insights into a safety culture (Wreathall, 1995).
USCG Safety Survey
High-risk organizations’ (such as a USCG air station) safety cultures need to be
regularly assessed in order to improve upon (Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, &
Gibbons, 2004). Case studies, surveys, field observations, interviews, and focus group
discussions, in particular, provide safety leadership with a snapshot of the safety culture
9

(Patankar & Sabin, 2010). Such assessments reveal performance indicators of the
organization’s SMS (Cooper et al., 2019). If safety practitioners intend to understand the
state of an organization’s safety culture, questionnaires and surveys are one of the best
means to do so (Wiegmann et al., 2004). Surveys are one of the best ways to gain
perspective into people’s opinions and beliefs (Wald, Gray, & Eatough, 2018).
The USCG annual safety survey is designed to identify and measure trends from
one year to the next. Air station leaders glean safety-related information from the people
who operate and maintain the air station’s aircraft. Survey results provide leaders
information relating to safety practices and the five USCG-defined safety sub-cultures
(later defined). In taking the survey, respondents are provided an anonymous means to
communicate safety issues such as mission scheduling practices, maintenance, leadership
impact, morale, and resource (USCG, 2016).
Survey items cover the U.S. Coast Guard’s five sub safety cultures as well as
hazard potential, adequacy of training, proficiency, standardization, effectiveness of
quality control, adequacy of resources, and physiological and psychological safety
aspects (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016).
USCG safety survey efficacy. A survey has existed in the USCG since the
1990’s. It has changed form since then, but the exact dates of the current survey are
unknown (A. Carvalhais, personal communication, November 28, 2018). There is
conflicting information about the survey’s tests of validity and reliability. It is unknown if
either the survey was never validated and tested for reliability or was once tested but
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those results are located in an unknown location by USCG aviation safety officials (R.
Figlock, personal communication, April 11, 2018, A. Carvalhais, personal
communication, November 16, 2017). Because of this unknown, this research sets out to
test validity and reliability.
Survey Validity and Reliability
Conducting a factor analysis helps determine survey validity, survey reliability,
and reveals the structure of latent variables (Field, 2018). Survey validity is necessary to
determine if an instrument is measuring what it sets out to measure (Rocco, 2011).
Content validity ensures that survey items properly represent the desired dimension
(Field, 2018). There is empirical grounding in using exploratory factor analyses to
validate surveys relating to safety cultures (Adjekum, 2017; Edwards, Knight, Broome, &
Flynn, 2010; Gibbons, von Thaden, & Wiegmann, 2006; Vinodkumara & Bhasib, 2010).
Survey reliability is an additional requirement in survey design which confirms
the survey’s ability to consistently measure the desired constructs and confirms if every
time the instrument is used, similar results can be expected (Rocco, 2011). The
Cronbach’s alpha is a common measure of survey reliability (Field, 2018).
Safety Culture Definition
Human error can be viewed as the source of many accidents and mishaps, so it is
worth inspecting the precursors of human error and see what is causal in the chain of
events leading up to an accident (Dekker, 2002). While it is important to investigate why
an error occurred, it is just as, if not more fruitful, to uncover other contributing factors
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that led up to the actual error or mishap. Embedded in this chain of events is safety
culture (Dekker, 2002).
A culture sets the overall tone in an organization and can affect many aspects of
work environments, including safety. Cultures are comprised of those shared rituals,
goals, beliefs, and values of an organization and its members (Wiegmann et al., 2004).
These values and beliefs are held by members at all levels of an organization and affect
safety behaviors (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010).
Safety culture can be described through its characteristics. A healthy safety
culture has features that enhance knowledge transfer, improve knowledge of risk
management, and have a means of receiving and providing feedback (Pidgeon, 1991).
Healthy safety cultures characteristically foster inclusion of all organizational members,
buy-in from safety leaders, and perpetuate safety promotion (Palframan, 1994). Healthy
safety cultures are free of blame (Palframan, 1994), augment safety motivation, are a
means of communicating safety information (Reason, 1997), encourage reporting and
learning safety information, and stand the test of time (Wiegmann, et al., 2004).
Safety culture importance and influence. Organizational culture is the
foundation of safe operations (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015) and is tightly connected to
operational safety (Wiegmann et al., 2004). Meanwhile, the extent of mishap occurrences
is strongly linked with failed safety cultures (Robertson, 2018). Within positive safety
cultures, not only are mishap occurrences kept at bay, but all the components of aviation
Safety Management Systems perform seamlessly (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015). Policies and
12

organizational cultures reside within SMSs (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015). Additionally, SMS
implementation, management commitment, and safety promotion all influence safety
cultures (Robertson, 2018).
USCG Safety Culture Sub-Components
The Safety and Environmental Health Manual is the primary guidance on all
matters relating to USCG safety. This manual classifies and categorizes mishaps,
describes hazard reporting, provides policy on the annual aviation safety survey, and
defines the U.S. Coast Guard’s safety cultures (USCG, 2016). These safety cultures are
the sub-components that comprise the greater safety culture and are summarized as
follows (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016):
1. Informed cultures have leaders who are knowledgeable about issues that affect
organizational safety.
2. Flexible cultures adapt with new hazards or changes in operational pace.
3. Learning cultures are comprised of key members analyzing safety data and
drawing conclusions in order to take further action.
4. Just cultures have members who trust their leaders to maintain accountability for
unacceptable behavior and to learn from acceptable behavior. In turn, the
organization’s members offer safety information without fear of reprisal.
5. Reporting cultures make it possible to report mistakes and hazards and further, are
encouraged to do so.
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Interaction of the Safety Culture Sub-Components
These sub-components interact with each other. Research conducted by Gerede
(2015), in a Turkish aircraft maintenance organization, illustrated the extent to which
safety culture sub-components were symbiotic. Reducing Gerede’s (2015) findings on
this topic to one statement: an organization cannot have one successful safety culture subcomponent without the rest. Gerede (2015) wrote, “Unsuccessful reporting is likely to
hamper hazard and risk analysis, risk mitigation measures, understanding the effects of
mitigation, measurement of safety performance, monitoring safety over time, finding the
root causes of factors that compromise safety, predicting the future and thus, taking
measures for and management of change” (p. 235). This quote elucidates how all the
safety culture components may degrade or augment each other.
The state of the just culture affects employees’ willingness to speak up which
affect the quality and quantity of safety information inputs (reporting culture) which is
needed in order to enrich the learning culture (Gerede, 2015). A relic of a healthy safety
culture is witnessed by the extent to which organization members report and learn from
mistakes (Wiegmann et al., 2004).
Interaction of Just and Reporting Cultures. Removing blame from errors and
mishaps will result in an enhancement of an organization’s just culture. Just cultures
promote the reporting of adverse events, mistakes, and hazards, which, in turn promotes
the learning safety culture (Cooper et al., 2019; McMurtrie & Molesworth, 2018). Just
cultures encapsulate reporting cultures. Edwards (2018) further emphasizes this point in a
description of failed just cultures in U.S. hospitals. In the hospitals researched, blame and
14

hostility were normalized; doctors’ and nurses’ careers were jeopardized if they were to
report their own mistakes. In such a climate, safety culture progress is blunted (Edwards,
2018).
Another example of the detrimental effects of unjust cultures may be found in
Liao’s (2015) research on pilots employed with a major Chinese airline. This research
exposed the negative impacts on reporting cultures due to pilot hierarchical power
differentials coupled with pilots’ intrinsic desires to maintain harmony within the cockpit.
This unjust culture created a barrier to the communication of safety-related data and
therefore inhibited the extent to which voluntary reports were made (Liao, 2015).
Trust encourages the voluntary communication of safety information and is
therefore requisite for just cultures to exist (Reason, 1997). The issue of voluntary or selfmotivated reporting safety issues has gained prominence due to the implications on
aviation safety management systems. In recent research, “fear of reprisal” was the leading
reason why Australian commercial pilots did not provide voluntary safety reports
(McMurtrie & Molesworth, 2018).
The Global Aviation Information Network provides guidance on creating and
sustaining a reporting culture that is just with the following characteristics (2004, p. 292):
•

Ease of making a safety report.

•

Professional handling of investigations.

•

Rapid feedback to the reporting community.
15

•

Separation of the department collecting and analyzing safety reports from that
with the authority to institute disciplinary proceedings and impose sanctions.

•

Independence of the managers from the reporting system.

•

Clear procedures for determining culpability and follow-up action.

Hazard Reporting and the Reporting Culture
In an effort to be proactive in mishap reduction, aviation organizations should
measure what leading indicators that are available. One such leading indicator is the
extent to which organization members are able to report hazards (Reiman & Pietikäinen,
2012). Such hazard reports provide leadership a means of knowing the health of their
organization’s safety culture and risks the organization faces. This is a proactive posture
for leaders to assume. In being proactive, leaders can detect and trap errors before they
surface as mishaps; however, members of the organization need practical skills necessary
to stay vigilant and discover hazards. In turn, there needs to be clear knowledge on how
to communicate hazards to leadership (Gu & Itoh, 2013; Reason, 2008).
Reason (2008) and Schein (2004) explain how leadership’s commitment to safety
is embodied by their reaction when safety-related information and hazards are reported. It
is critical that leaders treat safety reports as vital components of an SMS, and not pursue
any disciplinary action (Reason, 2008).
In order to find trends to make policy changes and operational decisions, hazards
need to get in the hands of leaders and safety officers (ICAO, 2013). Since catastrophic
aviation accidents are relatively infrequent, there is a resultant void in accessible data for
16

organizations to use in order to be flexible in creating change necessary to enhance an
aviation organization’s safety. Meanwhile, near misses and hazards occur far more
frequently and therefore, produce many more lessons worth informing aviation leaders
about (Reason, 2008). Once hazards are communicated, safety personnel can take a
proactive safety stance and attempt to be predictive with decisions thereafter (ICAO,
2013).
Major mishaps are comprised of those numerous, incremental risks that are
realized in day-to-day hazards. Having an understanding of such near misses and hazards
provide leadership with the ingredients that culminate and result in these infrequent major
accidents. Knowing these ingredients provide leaders an opportunity to preemptively
inject measures to reduce risk and mishap rates (Van der Schraaf et al., 1991).
Reactive safety postures, on the other hand, are more problematic than the mere
tardiness of an aviation organization’s mishap response. By having a reactive posture,
safety personnel are influenced by their present-time retrospection. Despite safety
analyzers best efforts, it is impossible to fully comprehend the real-time events when
looking back to a later time. In this scenario, the best that safety personnel can do is
respond with as much contextual understanding as practicable (Dekker, 2014).
USCG Hazard Reporting
There should be numerous systems in place for organization members to
anonymously report hazards (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015). In the U.S. Coast Guard, hazards
may be submitted via a hyperlink on the daily flight schedule (online via the USCG
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intranet), communicated verbally, or anonymously written down on paper and placed in
locked boxes throughout the air station (USCG, 2016).
USCG guidance provides a description of what an ideal reporting culture looks like.
In this ideal, there are numerous methods of communicating hazards; all air station
members know what the reporting requirements are; hazard reports occur automatically
without Flight Safety Officer (FSO) probing or initiation; leaders within the chain of
command add insight to a mishap report as it gets routed for approval; and safety
information is communicated with punctuality and timeliness (USCG, 2016).
The U.S. Coast Guard provides the following guidance to FSOs in cultivating hazard
reporting (USCG, 2016, p. 42):
•

Are there “Anymouse” boxes [similar to a suggestion box] throughout the base?

•

Is there an anonymous reporting link on your air station's flight schedule?

•

Does everyone know about these reporting boxes and link?

•

Mention the importance of reporting in your closing remarks to every one of the
numerous safety presentations you give.

•

Is the safety office in a strategic location? Does everyone know where the FSO
works?

•

Ensure Aviation Engineering leadership buy-in.

•

View the blue and pink sheets [mission flight log and aircraft discrepancy log,
respectively] on the previous day's schedule to catch any mishaps. If there were
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and you didn't hear about it, use this as an opportunity to educate aircrew on
reporting and take further action to bolster your unit's reporting culture.
USCG reporting policy. The U.S. Coast Guard promulgated policy on the
reporting culture. First, there is a requirement to have a means of anonymously reporting
hazards. Anonymous reporting boxes must be located such that people may drop paperbased reports and retain as much privacy and discretion as practicable. There should also
be a means of providing prompt feedback to show how the hazard was addressed or at a
minimum, acknowledged. All the while, leadership should emphasize their focus on
safety targets rather than seeking reprisal on those whom place hazard reports (USCG
Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016). USCG policy underscores the importance of
hazard reporting within an SMS by stating, “The command must establish a clear safety
message and achievable goals to create a positive command climate. These actions begin
with the free flow of safety information and hazard reporting at all levels of the unit, and
recognition for commitment to safety awareness and mishap prevention” (USCG Office
of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016, p. 1-5).
Research Questions
What is the extent of the relationship between U.S. Coast Guard aviation safety survey
data and the total of aviation hazards reported?
1. How are hazards reported in the U.S. Coast Guard?
2. How is hazard reporting an indicator of the health of an organization’s safety
culture?
3. How is it possible to determine if safety survey data predicts hazard reporting?
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a. Does the safety survey predict hazard reporting?
4. If the current safety survey does not predict hazreps, what are the potential
inhibiting limitations?
5. How can the safety survey be improved?
Hypotheses
H1: USCG safety survey items that relate to safety culture all load onto one EFA factor.
H2: The safety survey is reliable.
H3: The safety survey correlates with hazreps.
H4: The safety survey predicts hazreps.
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CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to determine the relationship between the U.S. Coast
Guard’s aviation safety survey and the extent to which aviation hazards are reported. This
study seeks to answer the following research questions:
What is the extent of the relationship between U.S. Coast Guard aviation safety survey
data and the total of aviation hazards reported?
1. How are hazards reported in the U.S. Coast Guard?
2. How is hazard reporting an indicator of the health of an organization’s safety
culture?
3. How is it possible to determine if safety survey data predicts hazard reporting?
a. Does the safety survey predict hazard reporting?
4. If the current safety survey does not predict hazreps, what are the potential
inhibiting limitations?
5. How can the safety survey be improved?
Research Design
This research study used a quantitative sampling of data from October 1, 2014 to
September 30, 2018 (Fiscal Year (FY)15 to FY18). The data came from two sources: the
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annual safety survey and the total number of hazard reports per air station per year. All
statistical procedures were completed using IBM SPSS Statistics software, version 24.
Figure 1 summarizes this research design and may be referenced to supplement the
methodology explanation that follows.

Safety Survey

HAZREPS

Independent Variable

Outcome Variable

• EFA
• Factors
• Reliability
• Averaged Survey
Factors

• Total Class Ds per air
station per year.
• < 500 dollars
• 0 injuries

Survey & HAZREP
Relationship
• Correlation
• Multiple Regression

Figure 1. Research Design Summary.
Safety Survey
Survey responses were drawn from the entire U.S. Coast Guard for four years
(FY15 – FY18). Surveys were taken by individuals whom, at the time of the survey, were
stationed at one of the Coast Guard’s air stations.
The U.S. Coast Guard uses an online service called Verint® to administer the
survey. The survey data was saved within Verint®’s servers (USCG, 2016). The USCG
Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1131) shared these data for the purpose of this research.
This research required access to all survey results for FY15 – FY18. Appendix A
contains the list of survey items.
At the survey’s inception, the USCG conceived an 8-point Likert-style scale for
most survey items. These response options are listed in Table 1.
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Table 1. USCG Safety Survey Likert-Style Response Options

Selectable Response

Meaning

0

Not answerd

1

Strongly agree

2

Agree

3

Neutral

4

Disagree

5
6

Strongly
disagree
Don’t know

7

N/A

The remaining survey items were multiple choice as well as open-ended. For the purpose
of this research, these survey items were not used.
The survey also branched, allowing particular demographics to answer a bank of
survey items, and disabling such items to other demographics. For example, some survey
items were intended for pilots only, while others were only intended for aviation
mechanics (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1131), 2018).
The survey had not previously been statistically validated or tested for reliability
(R. Figlock, personal communication, April 11, 2018, A. Carvalhais, personal
communication, November 16, 2017).
Participants. Participants in this study were drawn from a population of all ranks
found at air stations throughout the USCG. The population of safety survey respondents
were comprised of USCG pilots, maintenance personnel, and enlisted flight crew (rescue
swimmers, navigators, sensor operators, etc.). Demographics were captured in the survey
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including rank, current job, which USCG asset the respondent was assigned to (model of
aircraft), how long the respondent had been assigned to the current unit (air station), and
recency of last deployment (USCG, 2016).
A purposive sampling strategy was used to elicit responses to the survey which
was sent out via the internet. Participation in the survey was voluntary and Table 2
presents the number of survey respondents per fiscal year.
Table 2. Number of Survey Participants Per Fiscal Year.

Fiscal Year
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18

n
2,726
2,994
3,098
3,368

Likert-style scale and missing data. This particular Likert-style scale would
pose problems for the EFA if left unattended. First, 0 = not answered, is a selectable item
on the survey, but survey respondents could simply not answer the survey item, which
would result in missing data. Missing data was excluded pairwise, merely not using data
that was not existant. Since the survey data had such a large respondent number, ranging
from n = 10,622 to n = 2,307 (based on branching logic), it is statistically acceptable to
exclude pairwise cases. As such, excluding missing data by excluding the entire
respondent’s survey items, or by replacing the missing data with the mean, were
unnecessary (Field, 2018).
Likert scale responses of 0, 6, and 7 were excluded from the Exploratory Factor
Analysis because these answers would negatively impact the statistical procedure. By
excluding 0 = “not answered,” this was statistically the same as excluding pairwise cases
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for missing data. If respondents selected 6 or 7 (“Don’t know” and “N/A,” respectively),
the mean for that survey item would erroneously increase, trending toward “strongly
disagree.” Therefore, survey responses of 0, 6, and 7 were recoded to not factor into the
EFA.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
An Exploratory Factor Analysis evaluates clusters of underlying constructs and
may also suggest a reduction in the number of items in a survey (Field, 2018). This EFA
used Principle Axis Factoring (PAF). Oblimin and varimax rotations were both initially
performed for preliminary analysis. The oblimin was selected as the preferred rotation
method because there were fewer cross-correlations between survey items than the
varimax rotation. Sampling adequacy was evaluated using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
(KMO) test. Lastly, a reliability analysis evaluated the consistency of the survey scale
items using the Cronbach’s alpha.
To determine survey validity, survey items were clustered into latent variables.
These variables’ correlations were assessed, survey items that had low goodness of fit
values were removed, and the survey was subsequently re-analyzed. In factor analysis,
the process of extracting survey items may improve the survey’s validity and reliability
(Field, 2018). PAF analysis was performed in order to obtain eigenvalues for each factor.
The following items were analyzed using Field (2018)’s guidance:
1. The Scree plot along with the total variances’ eigenvalues to determine factorretention based on the plot’s point of inflexion in combination with factor
loadings.
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2. The Determinant, an indication of multicollinearity. In general, if the Determinant
is less than 0.00001, there may be a problem with multicollinearity.
Multicollinearity is when multiple variables are too closely related. If
multicollinearity exists, it may not be possible to determine the unique
contribution of a variable to a factor.
3. The KMO value measures how suited data is for a factor analysis. The KMO
should be greater than 0.5. The closer the KMO value is to 1, the more closely
compact variables’ patterns of correlations are, which indicates reliable, and
distinct, factors from the factor analysis (Kaiser & Rice, 1974).
4. The Bartlett’s test informs that correlations between variables are significantly
different from zero.
5. The Pearson’s correlation coefficients to confirm values between .3 and .9.
Coefficients that are less than .3 are likely a poor fit between an item and the rest
of the pool of items. Greater than .9, the items are representative of the whole
scale.
Factors. Factors are those underlying dimensions that emerge from an EFA and
are comprised of correlated survey items. An EFA provides a covariance matrix structure
to ensure that items that are highly correlated cluster under a specific factor (Field, 2018).
Factors with eigenvalues less than one were excluded from subsequent analysis. Factors
were then treated as their own new variables for the correlation and multiple regression
analysis discussed later.
26

Hazreps
In order to determine hazrep totals, Class D mishaps were categorized by
summing the mishaps that cost less than 500 dollars and sustained zero injuries. These
were totaled per air station per year. It was determined by the USCG’s Office of Aviation
Safety (CG-1131) that mishaps costing less than 500 dollars may be considered a hazrep
for the purpose of this research. The rationale for this decision was that, since aircraft
parts and maintenance labor hours are costly, most mishaps that cost 500 dollars or less
were actually mere hazards that had collateral, residual cost (C. Wright, J. Cooley,
personal communications, January 2, 2018). This point is illustrated in the following
example of an aircraft conducting a precautionary landing due to a suspected issue. After
landing, a maintenance inspection was performed which uncovered no aircraft issues.
Due to the maintenance that was performed, there would still be maintenance labor hours
(at a cost) associated with the inspection. This event may, however, still have a “free
lesson” and therefore get reported as a Class D mishap, which the Office of Aviation
Safety considers a hazard report (C. Wright, J. Cooley, personal communications,
January 2, 2018).
Correlation and Regression Between the Safety Survey and Hazreps
A correlation was performed in order to determine the extent of the relationship
between the safety survey and hazreps. Correlation is a statistical procedure that
determines if variables are related positively or negatively, if at all (Field, 2018). A
Pearson’s correlation procedure was used for this research.
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In order to establish if the safety survey variables predict hazrep variables, a linear
regression procedure was performed at the air station level (as opposed to the individual
survey respondent level). Using the equation for a line, y = mx + b, given any x,
regression is used to predict y (Field, 2018). In the context of this research, hazreps were
y, and the safety survey was x.
Data Collection
Survey data preparation. The survey responses were downloaded from Verint®
into .sav files, the IBM SPSS Statistics software file format. The data was stored on a
USCG-approved external hard drive (Imation Defender H200 + Bio 320GB) which
requires a fingerprint to unlock. These data were then combined into one file in order to
perform the Exploratory Factor Analysis.
Anonymity was assured through the use of the Verint® web-based questionnaire
system which assigns an 18-digit identifier code to each set of responses. With safety
survey data open in IBM SPSS Statistics software, the first column was deleted. This
column contained all respondent 18-digit identifier codes. Working from the
aforementioned hard drive with the identifier code deleted, respondents were
disassociated with their responses from the files used for this research.
There were no survey items with reverse-phrasing. Therefore, there was no need
to reverse-score the survey response data for any items.
Hazreps. There are multiple ways in which members of U.S. Coast Guard air
stations may communicate a concern, a near-miss, or close call. Depending on criteria
defined by USCG policy, however, hazreps may be published to the entire Coast Guard
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via the official mishap reporting system. This reporting system is called e-Aviatrs (USCG
Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016). For the purposes of this research, hazreps
will be exclusively drawn from e-Aviatrs because it is the only means by which USCG
hazreps are documented and stored and therefore, the only means by which hazrep data
may be extracted (C. Wright, J. Cooley, personal communications, January 2, 2018).
USCG Class D mishaps were downloaded at the air station level for the same four
years as the survey data (FY15 to FY18). This provided the total number of Class D
mishaps per air station per year, which was needed to compare air station safety surveys
with hazreps per year. Hazard reports were then parsed out of Class D mishaps.
After noting those Class D mishaps that were categorized as hazreps, these
hazreps were then summed for each air station by fiscal year. The hazrep total then
became the outcome variable for this research.
Data issue. An issue that might have impacted results is the unknown lag effect
between any changes in safety cultural and resultant safety behavior. In other words, the
safety survey may capture a safety culture that yields some result in hazrep totals, but it is
unknown when those effects on hazrep totals would be realized. In the context of this
research design, safety survey results and hazreps were analyzed within the same fiscal
year. If there was a misalignment with an air station’s safety survey and hazrep totals, the
statistical analysis would be skewed.
Averaged Constructs to Represent the Safety Survey for Correlation/Regression
Each construct that emerged from the factor analysis became its own new
variable. All survey item responses per factor for each air station, for each fiscal year,
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were summed, then divided by the number of answered survey items. This produced the
average response value per factor per air station per year. To put in other words, all the
responses for the survey items that comprised each PAF factor were averaged for each
year at each air station. This resulted in new variables that were then used to conduct
correlation and multiple regression procedures. This process is illustrated in Figure 2.
Survey EFA

EFA Factors

•PAF
•Reliability - Cronbach’s
alpha
•Reduce Survey data to
AIRSTA level

•Averaged Survey
Factors

Correlation &
Multiple Regression
•Survey factors &
Hazrep total

Independent
Variable: Safety
Survey

Outcome
Variable: Hazreps

EFA Factors

Total Hazreps
per air station
per year

n = 28 air
stations

n = 28 air
stations

4 years

4 years

Figure 2. Research Design Process.
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Correlation and Multiple Regression
In order to determine if the new independent variables (averaged survey factors)
were significantly correlated with, or predictive of, the dependent variable (hazreps per
air station per year), a multiple regression with forced entry procedures was performed. A
correlation table is simultaneously produced as part of the multiple regression procedure
in IBM SPSS Statistics software. Assumptions of independent errors, homoscedasticity,
and linearity were tested by producing a plot of standard residuals. Missing data was
excluded listwise.
Institutional Review Board (IRB)
University of North Dakota IRB approval was achieved on November 8, 2019.
The IRB Project Number is IRB-201811-097. Since no human subjects were studied for
this research, a UND IRB Existing Data Exempt Form was completed. U.S. Coast Guard
IRB approval was also required and approved on November 28, 2018. Both IRB approval
letters are included in Appendix B. Individual IRB training was completed on August 24,
2018.
Timeline
This topic was conceived jointly between the USCG Office of Safety and
Environmental Health (CG-113) and the USCG IRB on October 4 and 5, 2017. Data was
downloaded between June and October 2018. Expected graduation date is May 11, 2019.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
To summarize all the data analyses for this thesis, an exploratory factor analysis
of the U.S. Coast Guard’s aviation safety survey was performed using principle axis
factoring (PAF); then, the reliability of the survey was verified; using the resultant factors
from the survey’s factor analysis, statistical procedures were followed to determine if the
survey was correlated with, or had a predictive relationship to, the extent to which
hazards were reported. This chapter will describe the results for the PAF, survey
reliability, correlation procedures, and the multiple regression.
PAF Results
All KMO values in this analysis were above 0.5 except those individual KMO
values noted below. Also, all Bartlett’s test values were highly significant, p < .0001.
Rationale for Two PAF/Reliability Iterations
Two PAF and reliability iterations will be discussed in this section. Through the
process of analyzing the PAF, each iteration resulted in different values for the analysis
criteria listed in Chapter II (Methodology). As such, subsequent PAF iterations were
performed until the analysis was complete. This, however, resulted in a substantial
number of extracted survey items throughout the PAF process.
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The first iteration resulted in factor loadings with two (out of 52) survey items
extracted. The final iteration was performed, after adherence to statistical procedures and
PAF analysis criteria set forth by Field (2018), resulting in 32 survey items being
extracted. Since following these procedures to completion resulted in a survey with
merely 20 of the original 52 items, the first and the final PAF iterations will be discussed
to provide a before-and-after comparison of survey validity and reliability results. Also,
these two PAF iterations were used to perform correlation and multiple regression
procedures with the hazrep outcome variable, resulting in two analyses.
In total, there were four iterations of PAF, incrementally eliminating items
(detailed below). For each iteration of PAF, only the significant findings that resulted in
item-extraction are noted.
First PAF Iteration – Close Factor Loading Between Two Items
After the first PAF iteration, two survey items had factor loadings that were too
similar. These items, Q6R and Q7R, were subsequently extracted and not used in the first
reliability analysis which resulted in seven factors. Appendix A shows the factor loadings
after rotation, including eigenvalues and percent of variance per factor. Due to survey
branching logic, descriptive statistics varied. The first PAF iteration descriptive statistics
can be found in Appendix C.
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Table 3. First PAF Summary.

Factor
1
2
3
4
5
Eigenvalues
21.54 2.13 1.79 1.35 1.21
Percent of Variance 42.23 4.18 3.50 2.65 2.37
Item Quantity
7
6
6
3
11
.86
.80 .89 .80 .92
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

6
1.08
2.11
9
.89

7
1.01
1.97
4
.66

Figure 3. First PAF Scree Plot.
Factors 1, 3, 5, and 6 had a good factor structure because these factors had at least
five items with factor loadings greater than 0.4 (Field, 2018). These factors represent
flight skills & standardization evaluations, crew rest/workday, leadership & safety, and
unit safety adoption. These factors explained the total variance by 42.1 percent, 3.44
percent, 2.34 percent, and 2.05 percent respectively.
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Second PAF Iteration – Small Determinant & Poor Fit from Correlation Matrix
After the second PAF iteration, the Determinant was 5.67 X 10-14, which is less
than 0.00001. Three survey items, Q30R, Q113R, and Q118R all had Pearson’s
correlation coefficients less than 0.3 and were eliminated from further analysis.
Third PAF Iteration – Small Determinant & Individual KMO Values Less Than 0.5
After omitting Q30R, Q113R, and Q118R, the Determinant increased to 1.88X1013

but was still less than 0.00001. Verifying the individual KMO statistics, there were

twenty-nine more items to be eliminated. These eliminated survey items were: Q12R,
Q14R, Q15R, Q16R, Q17R, Q21R, Q22R, Q25R, Q33R, Q33R-Q39R, Q28R, Q65RQ71R, Q73R, Q74R, Q112R, Q114R, and Q129R.
Fourth and Final PAF Iteration
After excluding the aforementioned survey items, the Determinant increased to a
suitable 0.001, the KMO value was 0.953 which was still above 0.5, Bartlett’s test was
still highly significant (p < .0001) and the individual KMO statistics were all greater than
0.5. These values signaled the conclusion of the PAF analysis.
Appendix B shows the factor loadings after rotation. Items that clustered onto the
same factor suggested that factor 1 represented several topics including training quality,
FSO perception, Crew Resource Management, standardization, and protective equipment.
Factor 2 represented resources (time and experience). Factor 3 represented asset
reliability and satisfaction with protective equipment. All descriptive statistics can be
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found in Appendix D. Based on the same criteria used in the first PAF iteration, factors 1
and 2 had a good factor structure while the third factor was weak. Total variances
explained for factor 1 was 39.49 percent, factor 2 was 6.54 percent, and factor 3 was 5.28
percent.
Table 4. Final PAF Summary.

Factor
Survey Item

1

2

3

Eigenvalue
Percent of Variance
Item Quantity

7.90
1.31
1.06
39.49
6.54
5.28
11
5
4
.87
.79
.59
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization

Figure 4. Final PAF Scree Plot.
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First Reliability – All Original Survey Items Except Q6R and Q7R
The first reliability analysis was conducted using the first PAF iteration. Seven
factors had initial eigenvalues greater than 1.0. All survey items correlated well with the
overall scale (Field, 2018). As indicated in Table 3, all seven subscales’ Cronbach’s
were less than the requisite 1.0 and greater than .80, except Factor 7, Cronbach’s

= .66.

Second Reliability – Complete PAF Survey Item Extraction Adherence
The three subscales from the fourth and final PAF were used for this reliability
analysis. As indicated in Table 4, all three subscales’ Cronbach’s ’s was less than 1.0.
Factors 1 ( = .87), along with Factor 2 ( = .79) had high reliability. Factor 3 had a low
reliability ( = .59).
The last two survey items found in the list in Appendix B (Q79R & Q78R) had
common variance. However, if these items were extracted, there would only be two other
remaining items in factor 3, thereby resulting in no Cronbach’s

(no reliability metric)

for Factor 3. For these reasons, this was the logical place to conclude the analysis.
Correlation and Multiple Regression Results
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics used for the correlation and multiple
regression analyses. There were 110 valid cases of hazrep data per air station per fiscal
year. The missing data for two hazreps is due to Air Station Los Angeles being closed
after FY16. A positive skewness is confirmed with the histogram plot (Figure 5) showing
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a trend of data to the left. There is a slight positive kurtosis, indicating a heavier-thannormal-tailed distribution.
Table 5. Hazrep Descriptive Statistics.
N
Valid
110
Missing

2

Mean

9.14

Median

8.00

Variance

38.357

Skewness

.739

Std. Error of Skewness

.230

Kurtosis

.091

Std. Error of Kurtosis

.457

Minimum

0

Maximum

29

Figure 5. Hazrep Histogram.
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Correlation Results
Factors drawn from the first PAF and last PAF were used to represent the safety
survey at large. Since factors were a reduction in data, they served to represent this
model’s independent variables. Correlation procedures were performed concurrently with
the multiple regression procedures. To summarize the correlation results, there was no
significant correlation between the safety survey and hazreps.
The correlation matrix was checked for multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is
indicated by independent variables correlating too highly, based on a threshold of r > .9
(Field, 2018). With this criterion, there was no multicollinearity amongst the survey
factors (independent variables).
There were no independent variables (survey factors) that significantly correlated
with the outcome variable (hazreps). Table 6 indicates the correlation coefficients and pvalues for the first PAF. The most significant predictor amongst the first PAF analysis
was Factor1 (r = .151, p = .096).
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Table 6. Correlations Amongst Safety Survey First PAF Factors 1 to 7 and Hazreps.
Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Pearson
HAZREP 0.151 -0.010 -0.033 -0.039 -0.006 -0.064 -0.061
Correlation
Factor1
1.000 0.578
0.726
0.629
0.699
0.784
0.614
Factor2

1.000

Factor3

0.522

0.650

0.593

0.716

0.552

1.000

0.558

0.639

0.756

0.472

1.000

0.822

0.658

0.719

1.000

0.712

0.724

1.000

0.570

Factor4
Factor5
Factor6
Factor7
Sig.
(1-tailed)

1.000

HAZREP 0.096

0.466

0.390

0.370

0.481

0.290

0.299

For the last factor analysis iterations (Table 7), StrctFactor3 had the best correlation,
albeit also non-significant (r = .109, p = .175).
Table 7. Correlations Amongst Safety Survey Fourth PAF Factors 1 to 3 and Hazreps.
Pearson
HAZREP
Correlation StrctFactor1

HAZREP
1.000

StrctFactor1
0.029

StrctFactor2
-0.083

StrctFactor3
0.109

1.000

0.527

0.632

1.000

0.788

StrctFactor2
StrctFactor3
Sig.
(1-tailed)

HAZREP

1.000
0.402
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0.238

0.175

Multiple Regression Results
Two iterations of multiple regression were performed; one using the first PAF’s
factors and the second iteration using the last PAF’s factors.
In order to determine if the independent variables (survey factors) were predictive
of the outcome variable (hazreps), a multiple regression was performed using forced
entry procedures. Data was excluded listwise based on Field’s (2018) recommendation
(p. 302).
Assumptions of independent errors, homoscedasticity, and linearity were tested
using plots of standard residuals (found in Appendix F). Also, probability-probability (PP) plots for the residuals can be found in Appendix G. These plots portray the probability
of a variable with the probability of the distribution and are useful to look for variance
with skewness. These data were in compliance with all assumptions.
Factors 1 through 7 (first PAF) regression with hazreps. Factors 1 through 7
accounted for 14.7 percent of the variation in hazreps. The adjusted R2 provides a value
to determine how well the regression model generalizes. This model would account for
approximately 8.8 percent less variance in the outcome if the model were consequent
from the entire population. The quantity of this value indicates that the cross-validity of
this model is insufficient (Field, 2018).
F-statistics indicate if the multiple regression model has a statistically significant
improvement on predicting the outcome variable than if there were no independent
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variables (Field, 2018). Using survey factors 1 through 7, this model is not significantly
better at predicting the outcome variable than the mean outcome, F (7, 68) = 1.672, p =
.131.
Factor 1’s t-statistic was significant, t(68) = 3.20, p < .05, but no other factors
were significant predictors of hazreps. This indicates that Factor 1 was a significant
predictor of hazreps. As Factor 1’s values increased, the number of hazreps increased.
Additionally, all but Factor 1’s 95 percent confidence intervals contained zero.
Confidence intervals that contain zero indicate that there may be zero (or a positive or
negative) relationship between independent variables and the outcome variable. In other
words, it is indeterminable what the magnitude or direction of the relationship is between
survey factors 2 through 6 and hazreps.
Factors 1 through 3 (final PAF) regression with hazreps. The final PAF’s
factors 1 through 3 account for 8.8 percent of the variation in hazreps. The difference
between R2 and the adjusted R2 indicates an insufficient cross-validity of this model.
Using the final PAF’s survey factors 1 through 3, this model is not significantly
better at predicting the outcome variable than the mean outcome, F(3, 72) = 2.32, p =
.082. As was the case with the first PAF’s factors 1 through 7, the F-statistic is not
significant and therefore, this model also does not improve the ability to predict hazreps
better than if the model were not used.
The final PAF’s survey factors 2 and 3 were significant predictors of hazreps,
t(72) = -2.41, p < .05 and t(72) = 2.42, p < .05, respectively.
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Factor 1’s 95 percent confidence interval also contained zero making it
indeterminable what the magnitude or direction of the relationship is between survey
factors 1 and hazreps.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this research was to answer the research question: What is the
extent of the relationship between U.S. Coast Guard aviation safety survey data and the
total of aviation hazards reported? Subordinate to this overarching research goal were the
additional research questions and hypotheses. What follows is a summary of the answers
to each research question and hypothesis, one-by-one.
Research Questions
The primary research question for this thesis:
What is the extent of the relationship between U.S. Coast Guard aviation safety survey
data and the total of aviation hazards reported?
Using this study’s research design, there was no statistically significant
correlation or predictive measures between the safety survey and hazreps. Based on the
literature review, a significant relationship may very well exist between the safety survey
and hazreps if the survey were improved upon and if hazard reporting data were captured
differently. Recommendations on how the safety survey and hazard reporting may be
improved, and how that may affect the outcome of this, or similar follow-on studies, are
discussed later.
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Next, the subordinate research questions:
1. How are hazards reported in the U.S. Coast Guard?
Hazards are reported in numerous ways. In the U.S. Coast Guard, hazards may be
submitted via a hyperlink on the daily flight schedule (online), communicated verbally, or
anonymously written down on paper and placed in locked boxes throughout the air
station (USCG, 2016). While these methods of reporting are in compliance with the body
of literature’s recommendations, this particular research would have been enhanced if
hazard reporting were improved from the status quo. Such suggested improvements are
addressed below research question 4.
2. How is hazard reporting an indicator of the health of an organization’s safety
culture?
This question was also answered within the literature review. The extent to which
aviation hazards are reported serve as an indicator of the health of an aviation Safety
Management System (Adjekum et al., 2015; Cooper et al., 2019) and as a marker of a
proactive safety culture (Gu & Itoh, 2013; Reason, 2008; Reiman & Pietikäinen, 2012).
Proactive safety cultures are linked to hazard-mitigation strategies amongst aviation
organizations (Barach, 2000; Reiman & Pietikäinen, 2012).
3. How is it possible to determine if safety survey data predicts hazard reporting?
Figure 6 below is a recap of this study’s methodology to help with this question’s
lucidity. To summarize the methodology of this body of work, survey data was the
independent variable and hazreps were the outcome variable. In order to reduce the
survey into data that was useable for correlation and regression procedures, an
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exploratory factor analysis was performed which reduced the survey into factors, or
underlying constructs, which thereafter, represented of the survey as a whole.
Survey EFA

EFA Factors

•PAF
•Reliability - Cronbach’s
alpha
•Reduce Survey data to
AIRSTA level

Correlation &
Multiple Regression

•Averaged Survey
Factors

Independent
Variable: Safety
Survey

•Survey factors &
Hazrep total

Outcome Variable:
Hazreps

Total Hazreps per air
station per year

EFA Factors

n = 28 air stations

n = 28 air stations

4 years

4 years

Figure 6. Research Design Process.

a. Does the safety survey predict hazard reporting?
The safety survey is not predictive of hazreps, PAF factors 1-7: F(7, 68) = 1.672, p =
.131; PAF last factors: F (3, 72) = 2.32, p = .082.
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4. If the current safety survey does not predict hazreps, what are the potential
inhibiting limitations?
In answering this question, two main points of improvement have surfaced; first,
the safety survey and second, the method and extent to which hazreps are documented.
These are addressed below.
USCG Safety Survey Limitations
After excluding just two items, the initial 52-item survey had validity and
reliability with mixed results. The first iteration of PAF, factors 1, 3, 5, and 6 had good
factor structures and high reliability. From this point in the analysis, USCG safety
officers may consider omitting the rest of the survey items that are not included in these
factors. However, factor 1, pertaining to flight skills and standardization evaluations,
account for 42.23 percent of the survey’s total variance. Whereas factor 5’s latent
variable is associated with safety leadership and safety culture, two seemingly important
topics, but only account for a mere 2.37 percent total variance explained. Based on this
paper’s literature review addressing safety culture assessments, it is plausible for a safety
officer to retain the survey items within factor 5, despite the low variances explained. It
appears as though survey items are not adequately sensitive to the explanatory construct
of safety culture as compared to flight skills and standardization evaluation. This point
suggests a need for rewording and re-validation for content and criterion thereby making
the survey more sensitive to safety culture.
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After the final iteration of PAF, the survey resulted in only 20 out of 52 original
items. Since following all analyses with strict adherence resulted in a survey that only
partially resembled the originally-designed survey, great scrutiny should be applied to
what USCG leadership wishes to measure and how that information is attempted to be
obtained with this survey. For instance, factor 1 implied a good factor structure with high
reliability, but the survey item topics varied and lacked obvious themes. However, factor
2, had an obvious theme and resulted in high reliability. With this incongruence, USCG
leadership may consider rewording these survey items.
Through each iteration of extracting survey items, the survey’s validity improved
in terms of multicollinearity, factor loading similarity, item fit, and variable correlations.
This improvement in the survey’s validity comes at a cost of losing information USCG
leaders may desire.
As indicated in Tables 3 and 4, the survey’s reliability is currently high. Through
item extraction, survey reliability is less discernable given the first factor’s varying
themes as well as the general scarcity in number of factors.
These results are important for USCG safety leadership to better understand the
quality of the safety survey in order to know if it is measuring what is intended. This
knowledge will assist leaders in sustaining a robust safety culture assessment protocol.
Ultimately, assessing aviation safety culture is vital in reducing mishaps.
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USCG Hazard Reporting Limitations
Hazreps were extracted from Class D mishaps if the mishap cost less than 500
dollars and sustained zero injuries. 500 dollars seemed like a reasonable threshold for
USCG aviation safety leadership (C. Wright, J. Cooley, personal communications,
January 2, 2018), however, it is an arbitrary threshold. Perhaps, some hazreps cost more
than 500 dollars but were rich with learned-lessons. This would result in missing data that
was in the spirit of the research question. On the contrary, there may have been mishaps
that cost less than 500 dollars that were comparatively pedestrian. Ideally, there would be
a separation between Class D mishaps and hazreps. Class D mishaps could be kept within
the criteria similar to Class A, B, and C, namely, severity of injuries, cost, and damage.
Hazreps, on the other hand, could be comprised of voluntarily-reported items or learned
lessons. Hazreps could then better “reveal hazardous trends and underscore lessons
learned…” and get “reported to prevent recurrence of similar events that could result in
much greater injury or damage” (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016, p. 34). If hazreps were separate from mishap classification, research such as this would
reveal trends with more distinction.
Presently, there is no method for Flight Safety Officers to track hazard reports
unless they meet Class D mishap criteria. If there were a means of tracking those hazards
that got reported by verbal means, via the anonymous hazreps link on the flight schedule,
or via the Anymouse (suggestion) box, hazrep data would be enriched with quantity and
quality because bureaucratic barriers associated with formal Class D hazard reports
would not exist.
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5. How can the safety survey be improved?
Design and Planning
When drafting survey items, the point of continual reference should be research
questions. Research questions should exist to help the survey owners retain focus on what
it is they are trying to measure (Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2014). It is unknown if the U.S.
Coast Guard Office of Aviation Safety developed research questions during the survey
design phase. The survey, however, covers the topics of aviation safety, motor vehicle
safety, and recreational safety which adds to the survey’s complexity, length, and
confusion, all of which, degrade the validity of the survey as a whole (Blair, Czaja, &
Blair, 2014).
Pre-Testing
Pre-testing is the process of verifying that respondents comprehend, understand,
and are willing to answer survey items. This step is important to survey quality in order
to make necessary edits and to reveal concealed ambiguity before the survey is in use.
Response error is attributed to a lack of pre-testing and may affect response rates and
response quality (Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2014). It is unknown if the USCG pre-tested the
current safety survey. If pre-testing has not occurred, the survey could be improved by
conducting pre-test processes.
Survey Item Sequence
When the order of items is carefully considered, survey validity and reliability is
improved (Wald, Gray, & Eatough, 2018). Blair, Czaja, & Blair (2014) suggest placing
50

survey items relevant to the survey’s purpose early on. Doing so helps the respondent get
into the mindset of the survey’s topic while garnering interest in the survey. Then, while
respondents are still engaged, the most important and challenging questions should be
next (Wald, Gray, & Eatough, 2018). In the USCG survey, demographics are the first
string of survey items.
The most sensitive survey items should be toward the end of the survey, after
rapport has been established and the respondent feels more comfortable (Krosnick &
Presser, 2010; Wald, Gray, & Eatough, 2018). Lastly, similarly-themed survey items
should be grouped together in the survey. This makes the survey cognitively easier for
respondents. (Krosnick & Presser, 2010).
In review of the safety survey, there does not appear to be much grouping of
similarly-themed items nor are there more (or less) sensitive items toward the survey’s
end. It appears as though more consideration should be applied to the USCG’s survey
item sequence.
Survey Item Quality
The wording of survey items affects the quality of the survey as a whole (Blair,
Czaja, & Blair, 2010). Web surveys, in particular, should be clear because there is no
interviewer or proctor to consult if the respondent has a clarification question. This clarity
directly affects a survey’s success (Wald, Gray, Eatough, 2018). Blair, Czaja, & Blair
(2010) cite the following obstacles which degrade a respondent’s ability to answer survey
items: “Verbose, too many conditions, ambiguous wording, combining two questions into
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one, asking respondents to distinguish between subtleties, having categories that overlap
(Don’t know & N/A and 0=did not answer & actually not answering)” (p. 176). The
USCG safety survey contains items that present all of these obstacles.
Blair, Czaja, & Blair (2010) also suggest that specific terminology may not be
understood by all survey respondents. The safety survey contains jargon that may be
understood by many respondents, but perhaps not understood by all, especially those
respondents new to their positions and who lack experience. For instance, the first
question (after basic demographics) states, “1. Standards (unit ORGMAN, COMDT
policies, MPCs, etc.) are clearly defined for the job I do” (USCG Office of Aviation
Safety (CG-1131), 2018). Respondents may not know that ORGMAN is the acronym for
Organization Manual or what that manual’s purpose is. Similarly, new pilots may not
know what MPCs (maintenance procedure cards) are because pilots do not use MPCs and
new pilots may lack the on-the-job experience to have learned about MPCs.
Shadish, Cook, & Campbell (2002) suggest direct, simple wording in survey
items. In fact, each item’s wording should be tightly connected with a survey’s research
question (Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2014). Addressing multiple research questions, or the use
of double-barreled items, contribute to ambiguity over what interpretation is intended and
therefore degrades the quality of that survey items’ validity (Blair, Czaja, Blair, 2014;
Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). An example of this is, and one that is quite
applicable to this research is, “21. Leaders/supervisors in my unit encourage reporting
safety violations, unsafe behaviors, near-miss events, or hazardous conditions without
fear of reprisal” (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1131), 2018). It is unclear if the
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survey item is emphasizing the encouragement of hazard reporting or emphasizing a lack
of fear of reprisal. Furthermore, survey analysts will not know what underlying
dimension the respondent was addressing when there are more than one dimensions
included in a singular survey item (Blair, Czaja, Blair, 2014).
Another obstacle in addressing survey items involves including too many
conditions per survey item (Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2014). An example from the USCG’s
survey is, “10. Our unit members' life style, behavior, and judgment allow them to obtain
sufficient rest to perform their jobs” (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1131), 2018).
This item includes three conditions, which in turn, limit the respondents’ ability to
address this item if, for instance, the respondent’s rest is affected by other conditions not
mentioned here. There is more ambiguity in this item in that job performance may indeed
be affected by lifestyle, behavior, and judgement, but perhaps, not via rest. Ambiguity is
yet another obstacle that affects respondents’ ability to address survey items (Blair,
Czaja, & Blair, 2014).
Loaded questions (items) should be avoided. These arrive in different forms
(Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2014) and plague the USCG safety survey. Even though many
items’ response scale is on an agree/disagree continuum, some survey items are still
asking yes/no-type responses. For example, “31. My unit has sufficient experienced
personnel to operate safely” (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1131), 2018) elicits a
yes/no opinion and therefore, a bias towards yea-saying will impact this survey data
(Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2014). Alternatively, this survey item could be reworded and offer
a continuum of experience, or safety, for instance.
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Krosnick (1999) recommends that item scales should be divided evenly along the
response-continuum. All of the survey items used in this research contained an odd
number of sustentative responses, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree,
including “3 = neutral.” Additionally, the safety survey used a “Don’t know” and an
“N/A” option. All of these options may reduce survey reliability and validity because
those responses introduce bias associated with neutral answers (Krosnick, 1999).
Including such responses should be carefully and specifically considered for each survey
item, as opposed to the blanket decision to include such responses for all survey items
(Blair, Czaja, Blair, 2014). Lastly, the agree-disagree response format injects bias into the
responses and does not perform as well as item-specific response types (Saris, Revilla,
Krosnick, Shaeffer, 2010). The USCG uses agree-disagree responses for the majority of
the survey.
Survey Revision vs. Historical Data Analysis
Enacting these suggested amendments to the U.S. Coast Guard’s safety survey,
there is a risk of losing historical analytical power. With years of survey data, analyzing
trends over many years may become restricted if the safety survey sustains a complete
overhaul. Survey items, however, may still maintain measurement objectives through
careful revision (Blair, Czaja, Blair, 2014). Perhaps the greater gain involves losing
historical trend analysis potential in the way of having a new survey which accurately
measures U.S. Coast Guard safety practitioners’ research needs. If the safety survey gets
revised, it is widely suggested that survey authors should use survey items from
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validated, reliable, pre-tested, existing surveys (Blair, Czaja, Blair, 2014; Krosnick &
Presser, 2010; Wald, Gray, & Eatough, 2018).
Hypotheses
H1: USCG safety survey items that relate to safety culture all load onto one EFA factor.
H1 was hypothesized because safety culture is one of many topics addressed in the
USCG safety survey. Furthermore, the safety survey contains items that seemingly relate
to elements of safety culture (i.e., survey item 21., “Leaders/supervisors in my unit
encourage reporting safety violations, unsafe behaviors, near-miss events, or hazardous
conditions without fear of reprisal,” (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1131), 2018)
which addresses the reporting and just cultures). However, after each iteration of factor
analysis, safety culture survey items did not necessarily cluster together, nor remain
within the same factor. The first PAF somewhat resembled this hypothesis, however.
Specifically, factor 5 had the following survey items cluster together:
22. Leaders/supervisors set a good example for following rules and adhering to standards.
20. Leaders/supervisors in my unit care about members' quality of life.
24. Leaders/Supervisors in my unit react well to unexpected changes.
25. Leaders trust subordinates to manage routine operations.
23. Leaders/Supervisors in my unit discourage cutting corners to get the job done.
21. Leaders/supervisors in my unit encourage reporting safety violations, unsafe
behaviors, near-miss events, or hazardous conditions without fear of reprisal.
26. Leaders/supervisors are actively engaged in the promotion and management of the
safety program.
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14. Individuals are comfortable approaching supervisors about personal problems or
illness.
19. Safety-conscious decision-making is positively recognized by leadership, regardless
of outcome.
2. My Command effectively applies risk management (RM) principles and makes prudent
risk vs. gain decisions.
11. I have the authority to halt unsafe activities until the hazards/risks are addressed

These items are related leadership, which is closely tied to safety culture.
However, there are other safety-culture-related items that clustered onto other factors,
such as the following items:
5. Effective communication flow exists within my unit.
6. Effective communication flow exists with external units.
3. My unit recognizes individual safety acts through awards and incentives.
18. The Safety Officer/Safety Manager position is a desirable position in my unit.
9. The unit Safety Officer(s) is/are effective at promoting safety at my unit.
13. Safety stand downs are effective in my unit.

Lastly, after the final PAF iteration, no items relating to safety culture remained.
For instance, the entire list of factor 5 (first PAF) items involving leadership had been
extracted. To address H1, the final PAF iteration did not have safety culture survey items
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load onto one EFA factor because there were no longer any survey items related to safety
culture left remaining.

H2: The safety survey is reliable.
As addressed in the results section and research question 4 above, the safety
survey is considered reliable.

H3: The safety survey correlates with hazreps.
The safety survey does not have a statistically significant correlation with hazreps.
This holds true after analyzing the survey with the first and final PAF.
The normal distribution of hazreps (Figure 5) implies that using Class D mishaps
that cost less than 500 dollars with zero injuries is a reasonable way of obtaining hazreps
to use as the outcome variable for follow-on research. If hazreps were documented every
time they were submitted via other, none Class D mishap means, however, (verbally, via
the flight schedule hazrep link, using the Anymouse box), then hazrep data would be
denser with quality and quantity.
If this research were repeated, a correlation between the safety survey and hazreps
may be uncovered if both the survey and hazrep data were improved.

H4: The safety survey predicts hazreps.
Based on this research, methodology, and analysis, the safety survey is not
predictive of the extent to which hazards are reported.
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Follow-On Research After Safety Survey and Hazrep Improvement
Through the course of analyzing the U.S. Coast Guard’s safety survey and the
means by which hazards are documented, it is clear that the outcome of this research
could have different results if the survey were upgraded and if hazreps were documented
beyond the use of Class D mishap classification. Even if the methodology of this research
were kept the same, the correlation and regression outcomes may be different than these
results. As it presently stands, the safety survey is not compliant with colloquial standards
for questionnaires. It is therefore recommended that the safety survey be reworded, pretested, and validated. In so doing, USCG leaders may glean answers to their own research
questions, including those about safety culture, from the survey results. With those
results, this research could be repeated to determine if the survey is predictive of other
leading indicators of the health of a safety management system. In turn, this provides
leaders the opportunity to leverage the survey as a proactive tool.
This Research at the Individual-Level
There is additional potential to capitalize on the current safety data setup. The
data’s potency could increase by a factor of 96.5. The thought involves each air station
member being assigned an identification code, as is the case each year when the safety
survey is administered. If that user ID could be associated with an individual during that
member’s entire tenure at an air station (3 to 4 years), this research could stay at the
individual-level as opposed to analyzing the correlation/regression data at the air stationlevel. In other words, the survey data would not even have to be reduced to factors, but
instead, remain in its raw form. Instead of factors, the study could use individuals’ survey
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item responses as the independent variable. As for the outcome variable, safety managers
would have data associated with individuals’ hazard reports. Using the user ID, this
research could be repeated associating individual safety survey responses to the quantity
of hazards reported by each individual. With this current research, the number of lines of
data was 110. Meanwhile, survey responses totaled 10,622 for the last four years.
Keeping the data at the individual level rather than the air station level would increase the
data granularity by a factor of 96.5 (10,622 / 110).
This idea of associating an individual with a user ID to track their hazard reports
adds complexity to assuring anonymity. Based on research about the interaction between
just and reporting cultures, air station cultures would need to make its members truly feel
safe to report hazards without concern of reprisal. As the literature suggests, this is a
timely and exhaustive endeavor.
Conclusion
The U.S. Coast Guard safety survey does not predict the extent to which aviation
hazards are reported, nor is the relationship correlated. The premise that prompted USCG
aviation safety practitioners to probe into this topic is sound and the results of this
research may differ with improved means of measuring the U.S. Coast Guard’s aviation
safety data.
In recent years, several academic articles documenting and accounting for barriers
to reporting cultures have been published (Cooper et al., 2019; McMurtrie &
Molesworth, 2018; Vrbnjak, Denieffe, O’Gorman, & Pajnkihar, 2016). Other works have
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also been published documenting the importance of assessing safety culture (Reason,
2008; Stolzer & Goglia, 2015; Wiegmann et al., 2004). There still exists a gap that
directly ties the elements of safety culture evaluation with proactive means of assessing
safety management systems at large, such as hazard reporting.
Possible implications for research and policies based on this study are for other
studies to be performed using this methodology as a template in an effort to help safety
managers know if their safety metrics are effective at measuring what is intended. A
limitation for future studies is the researcher’s access to aviation organizations that
conduct safety surveys and document hazard reports (or are willing to do so).
Overcoming this limitation, safety practitioners have the potential to gain insight into the
state of their organization’s safety culture, and ultimately, suppress mishaps.
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APPENDIX A
List of Survey Questions
Rank.
E1 to E3
E4 to E6
E7 to W4
O1 to O3
O4 to O6
Civilian
Other

Current Job (choose one)
Aviation - Rotary-wing Pilot, Aircrew, or AMS
Aviation - Fixed-wing Pilot, Aircrew, or AMS
Aviation - Support (non-aircrew)
Ops Afloat - WMSL/WMEC/WHEC
Ops Afloat - PB/FRC
Ops Afloat - ATON/Icebreakers
Ops Ashore - Boat Station
Ops Ashore - Response
Ops Ashore - Prevention
Ops Ashore - ATON
Ops Ashore - Logistics
Ops Ashore - General/Other
DSF - PSU
DSF - MSRT
DSF - TACLET
DSF - MSST
DSF - NSF
DSF - Dive Locker

Which of the following assets/platforms are you assigned to perform your
operational duties? (If none, you may skip this question.)
H-60
H-65
C-130
C-144
C-27
C-37
Patrol Boat
Buoy Tender/Construction Tender/Tugs
WMEC/WMSL/WHEC/WPC
Icebreaker
MLB/UTB/RB-M
ATON
PSU/SPC-type
Other boat

How long have you been assigned to your current unit?
0-6 months
7-24 months
more than 2 years
Have you recently returned from a unit deployment? (choose one)
Within last 30 days
Within last 1-2 months
Within last 3-6 months
Within last 7-24 months
I am currently deployed
N/a; My current job doesn’t require deployments

1. Standards (unit ORGMAN, COMDT policies, MPCs, etc.) are clearly defined
for the job I do.
Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
Don’t know
N/a

2. Unit members, from the top down, incorporate risk management (RM)
principles/processes into decision-making for all activities.

3. My unit recognizes individual safety acts through awards and incentives.

4. Our unit trains its personnel to safely conduct their jobs.

5. Effective communication flow exists within my unit.

6. Effective communication flow exists with external units.

7. My unit adequately trains our personnel to perform their primary (specialty)
jobs/duties.

8. The frequency and quality of unit drills is sufficient that I am confident I would
know what to do in the event of an emergency (e.g., aircraft/vessel mishap, fire,
adverse weather, etc.).

What type of drill(s) would benefit you the most?
_______________________________________________________________

9. I was encouraged to take this survey.
Yes
No

10. My unit has a reputation for high-quality performance.

11. I have the authority to halt unsafe activities until the hazards/risks are
addressed.

12. I am able to perform my job without distractions.

13. Safety stand downs are effective in my unit.

14. Individuals are comfortable approaching supervisors about personal problems
or illness.

15. Morale in my unit is high.
If you agree, what does your unit do well to promote morale? If you disagree,
how would you improve morale?
________________________________________________________________

16. Personnel/crews work effectively as a team.

17. On a scale of 1 to 10, rate the unit's overall safety posture (1-Disastrous - 10
Completely safe).
1 – Disastrous
10 – Completely safe
N/a

18. The Safety Officer/Safety Manager position is a desirable position in my unit.

19. Safety-conscious decision-making is positively recognized by leadership,
regardless of outcome.

20. Leaders/supervisors in my unit care about members' quality of life.

21. Leaders/supervisors in my unit encourage reporting safety violations, unsafe
behaviors, near-miss events, or hazardous conditions without fear of reprisal.

22. Leaders/supervisors set a good example for following rules and adhering to
standards.

23. Leaders/Supervisors in my unit discourage cutting corners to get the job done.

24. Leaders/Supervisors in my unit react well to unexpected changes.

25. Leaders trust subordinates to manage routine operations.

26. Leaders/supervisors are actively engaged in the promotion and management
of the safety program.

27. I have easy access to all of the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) required
for the tools and chemicals with which I work (to include eye, ear, hand and foot
protection as well as a current MSDS for chemicals).*
If not, what PPE are you lacking?
________________________________________________________________

28. My unit's work performance when deployed is of the same quality as our work
performance when at home base.

29. Additional duties do not adversely affect safety in my unit.

If additional duties do affect safety, please explain.
________________________________________________________________

30. I am provided adequate resources (e.g., time, staffing, budget and equipment)
to accomplish my job.

31. My unit has sufficient experienced personnel to operate safely.

32. Over the past year, I believe the mishap potential at this unit has:
Increased
Stayed the same
Decreased
Don’t know; new to unit
If you selected "increased", why did mishap potential increase?
If you selected "decreased", why did mishap potential decrease?

33. What safety-related area does your unit excel at?

Off-duty Safety Programs

34. Which of the following activities do you engage in while driving?
Phone calls, no hands free
Phone calls- with hands free
Texting
Emailing
Eating
Other PDA use
None of the above

35. Our leaders do a good job communicating policies regarding motorcycle
safety.

36. Our leaders do a good job communicating policies regarding private motor
vehicle (PMV/POV) safety.

37. My supervisor assists me in identifying and reducing risks associated with
PMV/POV travel.

38. Our leaders do a good job communicating policies regarding drinking and
driving.

39. I do not drive fatigued.

40. My unit ensures that personnel are made aware of local area hazards for offduty activities.
41. My unit's off-duty and recreational activity program led by the unit safety
coordinator (or ground safety officer) is working well to reduce injuries.

42. The most significant action(s) my Commanding Officer, OIC, or Team Leader
can take to improve safety is/are:

43. If you were the Commanding Officer/OIC, what safety issues would you
make it a priority to address? (Choose up to three).
Crew training
Personnel shortages

Maintenance tempo

Operations tempo

Standardization
Caring for crews

Risk management

Crew fatigue

Non-punitive reporting culture

Hazmat and/or chemical hazards

Mishap preparedness
Crew experience level

(Operations-only questions)

Safety communications
Other

1. Stan/evals* are conducted as intended, to honestly assess crew qualifications,
standardization and proficiency. (*Terminology varies by community: includes
SEOPS/TSTA, RFO, STAN checkrides, workups, DORA, etc.)

2. Personnel must possess the appropriate experience and skills to earn
designations/qualifications in my unit.

3. The awareness of unit crews regarding familiarity with local area operational
hazards (e.g., navigational hazards, terrain, towers, traffic patterns, fuel
availability) is adequate to support safe and standard operations.

4. Crew rest policies are enforced at my unit.
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
I’m not familiar with our crew rest policies

5. Crew Endurance Management is a factor in our day-to-day operations and the
principles are followed.
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
I’m not familiar with crew endurance management.

6. Violations of required operating procedures or other local/unit regulations are
rare in my unit.

7. The stan/evaluation personnel at my unit (to include SEOPS, TSTA and RFO)
are well-respected.

8. Mission-related training conducted in a classroom setting is rarely postponed or
cancelled.

9. Our unit's operational demands allow members to obtain sufficient rest to
perform their jobs.

10. Our unit members' life style, behavior, and judgment allow them to obtain
sufficient rest to perform their jobs.

11. I have adequate time to prepare for and brief my missions.

12. Crews at my unit are able to maintain operational proficiency.

13. I am satisfied with the quality and fit of the personal protective equipment I
wear while conducting missions (e.g., helmets, survival vests, etc.).

14. My asset/platform(s) is/are capable of safely accomplishing the missions
assigned to it/them.

How can your unit increase proficiency and/or currency?

In what area(s) does the unit lack proficiency and why?

15. In your opinion, what will be some of the causal factors leading to the unit's
next serious on-duty mishap (Class A or B mishap)? (choose up to three)
Crew inattention/complacency
conditions)
Mechanical failure
collision hazards)

Poor weather (including low visibility

Fatigue

Inadequate/insufficient training

Congested operating areas (e.g.,

Maintenance error

Towing or ground equipment operations
HAZMAT
Poorly-designed (or lack of) procedures
Automation mismanagement
operational environment
Inexperience
Other

Rushing

Refueling / servicing /
A hazard we aren't aware of yet

Poor awareness of local hazards in

Physiological (nausea, disorientation, hypoxia)

16. (Aviation-only) The Crew Resource Management (CRM) program is helping
to improve mission performance, crew coordination, and safety.

17. (Afloat/Ashore-only) The Team Coordination Training (TCT) program is
helping to improve mission performance, crew coordination, and safety.

(Maintenance/repair personnel only)

1. Maintenance activities are accurately documented at my unit.

2. My unit effectively communicates pertinent maintenance information during
shift changes, duty section changes, and watch reliefs (as applicable).

3. Tool control is closely monitored.

4. Maintainers in my unit must possess the appropriate experience and skills to
earn qualifications.

5. Anyone intentionally violating maintenance procedures (MPC or other written
technical guidance) is swiftly corrected.

Comments on MPC/technical procedures violations:

6. Maintainers in my unit are given adequate training opportunities (C-schools) to
develop their skills.

7. Maintainers work effectively as a team.

8. Quality Assurance (QA) is well-respected at my unit.

9. Leaders/supervisors in my unit emphasize safe maintenance in achieving
operational readiness/availability goals.

10. Parts are sufficiently available to meet maintenance demands.

Comments on parts availability:

11. Required tools and equipment are serviceable and used at my unit.

Comments on tool quality.

12. Required publications are current and used in my unit.

13. My maintenance crew/team/shift is sufficiently staffed for its workload.
Comments on staffing.

14. (Aviation-only) My unit's Maintenance Resource Management (MRM)
program is helping to improve maintenance performance, coordination, and
safety.

(Pilots and coxswains only)

1. Crews are provided clear processes to address asset/gear discrepancies with
maintenance/engineering authorities before and after missions.

2. My Command (or team leader) effectively applies risk management (RM)
principles and makes prudent risk vs. gain decisions.

3. The Sector/District/Area (or other TACON) providing my mission tasking
effectively applies RM principles and makes prudent risk vs. gain decisions.

4. My unit closely monitors currency standards.

5. My unit adequately reviews and updates standards and operating procedures.

6. I know and understand the operational expectations set forth by unit leaders
(CO, OIC, OPS, Team Leaders, etc.).

7. My unit provides me with sufficient training hours per month to operate safely.

8. My unit has sufficient manning/assets to perform its current tasks.

9. The unit Safety Officer(s) are effective at promoting safety at my unit.

10. My unit closely monitors proficiency in flight and mission planning.

Appendix B
UND IRB Approval Letter

USCG IRB Approval Letter

Appendix C
Factor and Reliability Analysis– All Survey Items Except Q6 and Q7
The following is a list of the clustered items for the seven factors encapsulated in the first
iteration of Principle Axis Factoring.
Factor 1: Skills/standardization evaluations
Factor 2: Resources
Factor 3: Crew rest/workday
Factor 4: Standards monitoring
Factor 5: Leadership and safety
Factor 6: Unit safety adoption
Factor 7: Safety Officer and promotion

Table C1. Factor and Reliability Analysis– All Survey Items Except Q6 and Q7
Table C1.
Survey Item
1. Stan/evals* are
conducted as intended, to
honestly assess crew
qualifications,
standardization and
proficiency.
(*Terminology varies by
community.)

1
0.539

2

3

Factor
4
5

6

7

Table C1.
Survey Item
3. The awareness of unit
crews regarding familiarity
with local area operational
hazards (e.g., navigational
hazards, terrain, towers,
traffic patterns, fuel
availability) is adequate to
support safe and standard
operations.
2. Personnel must possess
the appropriate experience
and skills to earn
designations/qualifications
in my unit.
14. My asset is capable of
safely accomplishing the
missions assigned to it.
13. I am satisfied with the
quality and fit of the
personal protective
equipment I wear while
conducting missions (e.g.,
helmets, survival vests,
etc.).
7. The stan/evaluation
personnel at my unit (to
include SEOPS, TSTA and
RFO) are well-respected.
16. The Crew Resource
Management (CRM)
program is helping to
improve mission
performance, crew
coordination, and safety.
30. I am provided adequate
resources (e.g., time,
staffing, budget and
equipment) to accomplish
my job.
8. My unit has sufficient
manning/assets to perform
its current tasks.

1
0.501

2

0.495

0.478
0.428

0.426

0.329

0.505

0.501

3

Factor
4
5

6

7

Table C1.
Survey Item
29. Additional duties do
not adversely affect safety
in my unit.
12. I am able to perform
my job without
distractions.
31. My unit has sufficient
experienced personnel to
operate safely.
12. Crews at my unit are
able to maintain
operational proficiency.
9. Our unit's operational
demands allow members to
obtain sufficient rest to
perform their jobs.
4. Crew rest policies are
enforced at my unit.
5. Crew Endurance
Management is a factor in
our day-to-day operations
and the principles are
followed.
10. Our unit members' life
style, behavior, and
judgment allow them to
obtain sufficient rest to
perform their jobs.
6. Violations of required
operating procedures or
other applicable local/unit
regulations are rare in my
unit.
11. I have adequate time to
prepare for and brief my
missions.
10. My unit closely
monitors proficiency in
flight and mission
planning.
4. My unit closely monitors
currency standards.

1

2
0.474

3

Factor
4
5

0.425
0.363
0.354
0.781

0.740
0.740

0.535

0.452

0.358
0.690

0.617

6

7

Table C1.
Survey Item
5. My unit adequately
reviews and updates
standards and operating
procedures.
22. Leaders/supervisors set
a good example for
following rules and
adhering to standards.
20. Leaders/supervisors in
my unit care about
members' quality of life.
24. Leaders/Supervisors in
my unit react well to
unexpected changes.
25. Leaders trust
subordinates to manage
routine operations.
23. Leaders/Supervisors in
my unit discourage cutting
corners to get the job done.
21. Leaders/supervisors in
my unit encourage
reporting safety violations,
unsafe behaviors, nearmiss events, or hazardous
conditions without fear of
reprisal.
26. Leaders/supervisors are
actively engaged in the
promotion and
management of the safety
program.
14. Individuals are
comfortable approaching
supervisors about personal
problems or illness.
19. Safetyconscious decision-making
is positively recognized by
leadership, regardless of
outcome.

1

2

3

Factor
4
5
0.460

-0.799

-0.764
-0.762
-0.707
-0.648
-0.643

-0.569

-0.500

-0.381

6

7

Table C1.
Survey Item
2. My Command
effectively applies risk
management (RM)
principles and makes
prudent risk vs. gain
decisions.
11. I have the authority to
halt unsafe activities until
the hazards/risks are
addressed.
4. Our unit trains its
personnel to safely conduct
their jobs.
2. Unit members, from the
top down, incorporate risk
management (RM)
principles/processes into
decision-making for all
activities.
7. My unit adequately
trains our personnel to
perform their primary
(specialty) jobs/duties.
1. Standards (unit
ORGMAN, COMDT
policies, MPCs, etc.) are
clearly defined for the job I
do.
5. Effective
communication flow exists
within my unit.
6. Effective
communication flow
exists with external units.
8. The frequency and
quality of unit drills is
sufficient that I am
confident I would know
what to do in the event of
an emergency (e.g.,
aircraft/vessel mishap, fire,
adverse weather, etc.).

1

2

3

Factor
4
5
-0.355

6

-0.315

0.591
0.528

0.526
0.508

0.488
0.411
0.404

7

Table C1.
Survey Item

1

2

3

3. My unit recognizes
individual safety acts
through awards and
incentives.
10. My unit has a
reputation for high-quality
performance.
18. The Safety
Officer/Safety Manager
position is a desirable
position in my unit.
9. The unit Safety
Officer(s) is/are effective at
promoting safety at my
unit.
13. Safety stand downs are
effective in my unit.
Eigenvalues
21.54 2.13
1.79
Percent of Variance
42.23 4.18
3.50
.86
.80
.89
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
Factor 1: Skills/standardization evaluations
Factor 2: Resources
Factor 3: Crew rest/workday
Factor 4: Standards monitoring
Factor 5: Leadership and safety
Factor 6: Unit safety adoption
Factor 7: Safety Officer and promotion

Factor
4
5

6
0.370

7
0.341

0.369
0.508

0.389

0.440

0.342
1.35
2.65
.80

1.21
2.37
.92

1.08
2.11
.89

1.01
1.97
.66

Appendix D
Factor and Reliability Analysis – Final PAF Survey Item Extraction Adherence
The following is a list of the clustered items for the three factors encapsulated in the
fourth iteration of Principle Axis Factoring.
Factor 1 represented several topics including training quality, FSO perception, Crew
Resource Management, standardization, and protective equipment.
Factor 2 represented resources, namely time and experience.
Factor 3 represented asset reliability and satisfaction with protective equipment
Factor
Table D1.
Survey Item

1

9. The unit Safety Officer(s) is/are effective at promoting
safety at my unit.
3. My unit recognizes individual safety acts through awards
and incentives.
19. Safety-conscious decision-making is
positively recognized by leadership, regardless of outcome.

0.719

1. Crews are provided clear processes to address asset/gear
discrepancies with maintenance/engineering authorities
before and after missions.
13. Safety stand downs are effective in my unit.

0.603

5. My unit adequately reviews and updates standards and
operating procedures.

0.551

16. The Crew Resource Management (CRM) program is
helping to improve mission performance, crew
coordination, and safety.
1. Standards (unit ORGMAN, COMDT policies, MPCs,
etc.) are clearly defined for the job I do.

0.512

0.653
0.631

0.565

0.470

2

3

Factor
Table D1.
Survey Item

1

8. The frequency and quality of unit drills is sufficient that I
am confident I would know what to do in the event of an
emergency (e.g., aircraft/vessel mishap, fire, adverse
weather, etc.).

0.426

28. My unit's work performance when deployed is of the
same quality as our work performance when at home base.

0.406

27. I have easy access to all of the Personal Protective
Equipment (PPE) required for the tools and chemicals with
which I work (to include eye, ear, hand and foot protection
as well as a current MSDS for chemicals).*

0.357

2

30. I am provided adequate resources (e.g., time, staffing,
budget and equipment) to accomplish my job.

0.722

12. I am able to perform my job without distractions.

0.662

29. Additional duties do not adversely affect safety in my
unit.
31. My unit has sufficient experienced personnel to operate
safely.
8. Mission-related training conducted in a classroom setting
is rarely postponed or cancelled.

0.631

14. My asset is capable of safely accomplishing the
missions assigned to it.
13. I am satisfied with the quality and fit of the personal
protective equipment I wear while conducting missions
(e.g., helmets, survival vests, etc.).
11. I have adequate time to prepare for and brief my
missions.
12. Crews at my unit are able to maintain operational
proficiency.
Eigenvalue
Percent of Variance

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization

3

0.537
0.370

0.530
0.479

0.355

0.385

0.328

0.330

7.90
39.49

1.31
6.54

1.06
5.28

.87

.79

.59

Appendix E
First PAF Iteration – Close Factor Loading
Table E1. First PAF Iteration.
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
1. Standards (unit
ORGMAN, COMDT policies,
MPCs, etc.) are clearly defined for
the job I do.

1.8607

Std.
Deviation
0.77004

Analysis
N
10622

Missing
N
99

2. Unit members, from the top
down, incorporate risk
management (RM)
principles/processes into decisionmaking for all activities.

1.8083

0.73444

10531

190

3. My unit recognizes individual
safety acts through awards and
incentives.

2.0882

0.92949

10385

336

4. Our unit trains its personnel to
safely conduct their jobs.

1.8407

0.71320

10575

146

5. Effective communication flow
exists within my unit.

2.3004

1.00099

10496

225

6. Effective communication flow
exists with external units.

2.3816

0.89955

9600

1121

7. My unit adequately trains our
personnel to perform their primary
(specialty) jobs/duties.

1.9797

0.80184

10552

169

Table E1. First PAF Iteration.
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
8. The frequency and quality of
unit drills is sufficient that I am
confident I would know what to do
in the event of an emergency (e.g.,
aircraft/vessel mishap, fire,
adverse weather, etc.).

2.1636

Std.
Deviation
0.86291

Analysis
N
10456

Missing
N
265

10. My unit has a reputation for
high-quality performance.

1.6678

0.71274

10472

249

11. I have the authority to halt
unsafe activities until the
hazards/risks are addressed.

1.5918

0.70268

10589

132

12. I am able to perform my job
without distractions.

2.4378

1.05076

10617

104

13. Safety stand downs are
effective in my unit.

2.1047

0.84821

9890

831

14. Individuals are comfortable
approaching supervisors about
personal problems or illness.

1.8576

0.78534

10506

215

18. The Safety Officer/Safety
Manager position is a desirable
position in my unit.

2.4805

0.82473

9473

1248

19. Safety-conscious decisionmaking is positively recognized by
leadership, regardless of outcome.

2.0062

0.77918

10341

380

20. Leaders/supervisors in my unit
care about members' quality of
life.

1.8764

0.83934

10532

189

Table E1. First PAF Iteration.
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
21. Leaders/supervisors in my unit
encourage reporting safety
violations, unsafe behaviors, nearmiss events, or hazardous
conditions without fear of reprisal.

1.7902

Std.
Deviation
0.72453

Analysis
N
10504

Missing
N
217

22. Leaders/supervisors set a good
example for following rules and
adhering to standards.

1.9147

0.77605

10519

202

23. Leaders/Supervisors in my
unit discourage cutting corners to
get the job done.

1.8494

0.80645

10495

226

24. Leaders/Supervisors in my
unit react well to unexpected
changes.

2.0634

0.84482

10470

251

25. Leaders trust subordinates to
manage routine operations.

2.0585

0.88583

10549

172

26. Leaders/supervisors are
actively engaged in the promotion
and management of the safety
program.

1.9794

0.70199

10319

402

27. I have easy access to all of the
Personal Protective Equipment
(PPE) required for the tools and
chemicals with which I work (to
include eye, ear, hand and foot
protection as well as a current
MSDS for chemicals).*

1.8524

0.77387

10287

434

16. Personnel/crews work
effectively as a team.

1.8138

0.64390

10569

152

Table E1. First PAF Iteration.
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
28. My unit's work performance
when deployed is of the same
quality as our work performance
when at home base.

1.9318

Std.
Deviation
0.73220

Analysis
N
7703

Missing
N
3018

29. Additional duties do not
adversely affect safety in my unit.

2.4127

0.93705

10085

636

30. I am provided adequate
resources (e.g., time, staffing,
budget and equipment) to
accomplish my job.

2.5709

1.09495

10570

151

31. My unit has sufficient
experienced personnel to operate
safely.

2.2473

0.94334

10505

216

1. Stan/evals* are conducted as
intended, to honestly assess crew
qualifications, standardization and
proficiency. (*Terminology varies
by community.)

1.7590

0.67173

6606

4115

2. Personnel must possess the
appropriate experience and skills
to earn designations/qualifications
in my unit.

1.7623

0.69107

6777

3944

3. The awareness of unit crews
regarding familiarity with local
area operational hazards (e.g.,
navigational hazards, terrain,
towers, traffic patterns, fuel
availability) is adequate to support
safe and standard operations.

1.7778

0.61886

6720

4001

Table E1. First PAF Iteration.
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
4. Crew rest policies are enforced
at my unit.

1.9092

Std.
Deviation
0.81161

Analysis
N
6763

Missing
N
3958

5. Crew Endurance Management is
a factor in our day-to-day
operations and the principles are
followed.

2.0101

0.80228

6317

4404

6. Violations of required operating
procedures or other applicable
local/unit regulations are rare in
my unit.

1.9202

0.69775

6426

4295

7. The stan/evaluation personnel at
my unit (to include SEOPS, TSTA
and RFO) are well-respected.

1.8037

0.67397

6519

4202

8. Mission-related training
conducted in a classroom setting is
rarely postponed or cancelled.

2.3317

0.93837

6288

4433

9. Our unit's operational demands
allow members to obtain sufficient
rest to perform their jobs.

2.2097

0.84344

6738

3983

10. Our unit members' life style,
behavior, and judgment allow
them to obtain sufficient rest to
perform their jobs.

2.0257

0.67553

6502

4219

11. I have adequate time to prepare
for and brief my missions.

1.9978

0.69877

6700

4021

12. Crews at my unit are able to
maintain operational proficiency.

2.1274

0.81904

6734

3987

Table E1. First PAF Iteration.
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
13. I am satisfied with the quality
and fit of the personal protective
equipment I wear while
conducting missions (e.g., helmets,
survival vests, etc.).

1.9600

Std.
Deviation
0.80479

Analysis
N
6733

Missing
N
3988

14. My asset is capable of safely
accomplishing the missions
assigned to it.

1.9071

0.74653

6774

3947

16. The Crew Resource
Management (CRM) program is
helping to improve mission
performance, crew coordination,
and safety.

1.8673

0.66990

5072

5649

1. Crews are provided clear
processes to address asset/gear
discrepancies with
maintenance/engineering
authorities before and after
missions.

1.6081

0.61028

2493

8228

2. My Command effectively
applies risk management (RM)
principles and makes prudent risk
vs. gain decisions.

1.5799

0.62900

2502

8219

3. The Sector/District/Area (or
other TACON) providing my
mission tasking effectively applies
RM principles and makes prudent
risk vs. gain decisions.

2.5275

1.03767

2307

8414

4. My unit closely monitors
currency standards.

1.6492

0.64553

2500

8221

Table E1. First PAF Iteration.
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
5. My unit adequately reviews and
updates standards and operating
procedures.

1.7934

Std.
Deviation
0.73776

Analysis
N
2478

Missing
N
8243

6. I know and understand the
operational expectations set forth
by unit leaders (CO, OPS, etc.).

1.6849

0.68919

2510

8211

7. My unit provides me
with sufficient training hours per
month to operate safely.

2.0647

0.90496

2472

8249

8. My unit has sufficient
manning/assets to perform its
current tasks.

2.5868

1.12808

2500

8221

9. The unit Safety Officer(s) is/are
effective at promoting safety at my
unit.

1.7094

0.64132

2498

8223

10. My unit closely
monitors proficiency in flight and
mission planning.

1.8163

0.73220

2477

8244

Appendix F
Fourth PAF Iteration – Satisfactory to Proceed to Reliability
Table F1. Fourth PAF Iteration
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
1. Standards (unit
ORGMAN, COMDT policies,
MPCs, etc.) are clearly defined for
the job I do.

1.8607

Std.
Deviation
0.77004

Analysis
N
10622

Missing
N
90

3. My unit recognizes individual
safety acts through awards and
incentives.

2.0882

0.92949

10385

327

8. The frequency and quality of unit
drills is sufficient that I am confident
I would know what to do in the
event of an emergency (e.g.,
aircraft/vessel mishap, fire, adverse
weather, etc.).

2.1636

0.86291

10456

256

12. I am able to perform my job
without distractions.

2.4378

1.05076

10617

95

13. Safety stand downs are effective
in my unit.

2.1047

0.84821

9890

822

19. Safety-conscious decisionmaking is positively recognized by
leadership, regardless of outcome.

2.0062

0.77918

10341

371

Table F1. Fourth PAF Iteration
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
27. I have easy access to all of the
Personal Protective Equipment
(PPE) required for the tools and
chemicals with which I work (to
include eye, ear, hand and foot
protection as well as a current
MSDS for chemicals).*

1.8524

Std.
Deviation
0.77387

Analysis
N
10287

Missing
N
425

28. My unit's work performance
when deployed is of the same
quality as our work performance
when at home base.

1.9318

0.73220

7703

3009

29. Additional duties do not
adversely affect safety in my unit.

2.4127

0.93705

10085

627

30. I am provided adequate
resources (e.g., time, staffing,
budget and equipment) to
accomplish my job.

2.5709

1.09495

10570

142

31. My unit has sufficient
experienced personnel to operate
safely.

2.2473

0.94334

10505

207

8. Mission-related training
conducted in a classroom setting is
rarely postponed or cancelled.

2.3317

0.93837

6288

4424

11. I have adequate time to prepare
for and brief my missions.

1.9978

0.69877

6700

4012

12. Crews at my unit are able to
maintain operational proficiency.

2.1274

0.81904

6734

3978

Table F1. Fourth PAF Iteration
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
13. I am satisfied with the quality
and fit of the personal protective
equipment I wear while conducting
missions (e.g., helmets, survival
vests, etc.).

1.9600

Std.
Deviation
0.80479

Analysis
N
6733

Missing
N
3979

14. My asset is capable of safely
accomplishing the missions assigned
to it.

1.9071

0.74653

6774

3938

16. The Crew Resource
Management (CRM) program is
helping to improve mission
performance, crew coordination, and
safety.

1.8673

0.66990

5072

5640

1. Crews are provided clear
processes to address asset/gear
discrepancies with
maintenance/engineering authorities
before and after missions.

1.6081

0.61028

2493

8219

5. My unit adequately reviews and
updates standards and operating
procedures.

1.7934

0.73776

2478

8234

9. The unit Safety Officer(s) is/are
effective at promoting safety at my
unit.

1.7094

0.64132

2498

8214

Appendix G
Table G1.
Q11R
Q12R
Q13R
Q14R
Q15R
Q16R
Q17R
Q18R
Q21R
Q22R
Q23R
Q24R
Q25R
Q30R
Q31R
Q33R
Q34R
Q35R
Q36R
Q37R
Q38R
Q39R

List of Survey Items Used for Analysis with USCG-Defined Item Coding
1. Standards (unit ORGMAN, COMDT policies, MPCs, etc.) are clearly
defined for the job I do.
2. Unit members, from the top down, incorporate risk management (RM)
principles/processes into decision-making for all activities.
3. My unit recognizes individual safety acts through awards and
incentives.
4. Our unit trains its personnel to safely conduct their jobs.
5. Effective communication flow exists within my unit.
6. Effective communication flow exists with external units.
7. My unit adequately trains our personnel to perform their primary
(specialty) jobs/duties.
8. The frequency and quality of unit drills is sufficient that I am confident
I would know what to do in the event of an emergency (e.g.,
aircraft/vessel mishap, fire, adverse weather, etc.).
10. My unit has a reputation for high-quality performance.
11. I have the authority to halt unsafe activities until the hazards/risks are
addressed.
12. I am able to perform my job without distractions.
13. Safety stand downs are effective in my unit.
14. Individuals are comfortable approaching supervisors about personal
problems or illness.
18. The Safety Officer/Safety Manager position is a desirable position in
my unit.
19. Safety-conscious decision-making is positively recognized by
leadership, regardless of outcome.
20. Leaders/supervisors in my unit care about members' quality of life.
21. Leaders/supervisors in my unit encourage reporting safety violations,
unsafe behaviors, near-miss events, or hazardous conditions without fear
of reprisal.
22. Leaders/supervisors set a good example for following rules and
adhering to standards.
23. Leaders/Supervisors in my unit discourage cutting corners to get the
job done.
24. Leaders/Supervisors in my unit react well to unexpected changes.
25. Leaders trust subordinates to manage routine operations.
26. Leaders/supervisors are actively engaged in the promotion and
management of the safety program.

Table G1.
Q40R
Q28R
Q42R
Q43R
Q45R
Q46R
Q65R
Q66R
Q67R

Q68R
Q69R
Q70R
Q71R
Q72R
Q73R
Q74R
Q75R
Q76R
Q78R
Q79R
Q81R
Q111R

List of Survey Items Used for Analysis with USCG-Defined Item Coding
27. I have easy access to all of the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
required for the tools and chemicals with which I work (to include eye,
ear, hand and foot protection as well as a current MSDS for chemicals).*
16. Personnel/crews work effectively as a team.
28. My unit's work performance when deployed is of the same quality as
our work performance when at home base.
29. Additional duties do not adversely affect safety in my unit.
30. I am provided adequate resources (e.g., time, staffing, budget and
equipment) to accomplish my job.
31. My unit has sufficient experienced personnel to operate safely.
1. Stan/evals* are conducted as intended, to honestly assess crew
qualifications, standardization and proficiency. (*Terminology varies by
community.)
2. Personnel must possess the appropriate experience and skills to earn
designations/qualifications in my unit.
3. The awareness of unit crews regarding familiarity with local
area operational hazards (e.g., navigational hazards, terrain, towers, traffic
patterns, fuel availability) is adequate to support safe and standard
operations.
4. Crew rest policies are enforced at my unit.
5. Crew Endurance Management is a factor in our day-to-day operations
and the principles are followed.
6. Violations of required operating procedures or other applicable
local/unit regulations are rare in my unit.
7. The stan/evaluation personnel at my unit (to include SEOPS, TSTA and
RFO) are well-respected.
8. Mission-related training conducted in a classroom setting is rarely
postponed or cancelled.
9. Our unit's operational demands allow members to obtain sufficient rest
to perform their jobs.
10. Our unit members' life style, behavior, and judgment allow them to
obtain sufficient rest to perform their jobs.
11. I have adequate time to prepare for and brief my missions.
12. Crews at my unit are able to maintain operational proficiency.
13. I am satisfied with the quality and fit of the personal protective
equipment I wear while conducting missions (e.g., helmets, survival vests,
etc.).
14. My asset is capable of safely accomplishing the missions assigned to
it.
16. The Crew Resource Management (CRM) program is helping to
improve mission performance, crew coordination, and safety.
1. Crews are provided clear processes to address asset/gear discrepancies
with maintenance/engineering authorities before and after missions.

Table G1.
Q112R
Q113R
Q114R
Q115R
Q116R
Q117R
Q118R
Q119R
Q129R

List of Survey Items Used for Analysis with USCG-Defined Item Coding
2. My Command effectively applies risk management (RM) principles
and makes prudent risk vs. gain decisions.
3. The Sector/District/Area (or other TACON) providing my mission
tasking effectively applies RM principles and makes prudent risk vs. gain
decisions.
4. My unit closely monitors currency standards.
5. My unit adequately reviews and updates standards and operating
procedures.
6. I know and understand the operational expectations set forth by unit
leaders (CO, OPS, etc.).
7. My unit provides me with sufficient training hours per month to operate
safely.
8. My unit has sufficient manning/assets to perform its current tasks.
9. The unit Safety Officer(s) is/are effective at promoting safety at my
unit.
10. My unit closely monitors proficiency in flight and mission planning.

APPENDIX H
First PAF Factors 1 – 7 Zpred Scatterplot

APPENDIX I
Final PAF Factors 1 – 3 Zpred Scatterplot

APPENDIX J
P-P Plot for First PAF

APPENDIX K
P-P Plot for Final PAF
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